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WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW TIGHTROPE:
USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO COUNTER
TERRORISM—WILLING THE ENDS
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*

T

he UN Charter reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a
political system to govern conflicts between states. It does not directly address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in
the post-World War II period. The drafters did not contemplate the existence of international terrorists nor their tenacity and access to technology. In view of the fact that terrorist groups appear to have reached a
global sophistication, there is little doubt that international terrorism presents a threat with which traditional theories for the use of military force
are inadequate to deal with, and were not contemplated when the UN
Charter was drafted. This Article is premised on the theme that the right
to self-defence is enrolled in a process of change. The focal point of state
practice in the Article is the United States, which has long sought to articulate, through official policy, use of force as a counter-terrorism
measure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The senseless mayhem of World War I—the destruction of economic
structures, dissipation of financial resources, and undermining of political stability—wiped the gloss from the traditional notion of war as a rational political act. The war was disastrous to both its initiators and
victims. Millions died pointlessly and whole regimes fell. The carnage
forced modern industrial societies to question war as an instrument of
* LL.B (Hons) (Moi), LL.M (Hons) (Cantab), Ph.D (Melb), GCertPPT(UoN). Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Newcastle (Australia). The author wishes to
acknowledge the enlightening comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees.
The author further acknowledges the excellent editorial work by the team at the Brooklyn
Journal of International Law in the preparation of the Article. Any errors remain the
author’s.
1. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
art. 1, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1928, 46 U.S.T. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into
force July 24, 1929) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. By the time it entered into force,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been signed and ratified/acceded to by a total of fifty-nine
States (including all the States (major and minor) that were subsequently to comprise the
Axis Powers), almost all the States comprising the international community at that time.
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national policy; where the benefits of conquest (a major incentive in previous centuries) seemed trivial by comparison with the costs of war—
large scale death and destruction, political instability and economic turmoil for all involved—it seemed obvious that war was no longer a profitable enterprise.
In response to the destruction of World War I, the League of Nations
formed as an international organization to usher in collective security and
replace a centuries old militaristic balance of power, and was an ambitious move to curb sovereign military excesses and guarantee world
peace. However, it was during the League’s chequered existence that two
issues of significance fell on the international agenda—terrorism and the
limitation of the use of military force. With the formation of the League
of Nations, and renewed efforts to prevent future violence, the freedom
of states to resort to military force became more and more restricted,
while the right of self-defence gained in significance, displacing the expansive right of self-preservation.
One of the League’s most significant efforts was the creation and adoption of the International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928.1 The Pact
prohibited war as an instrument of national policy and recognized the
right of self-defence as a legal right, thus tacitly excluding other previously accepted forms of self-help as avenues legitimating the use of military force.2
2. Kellogg-Briand Pact states:
[P]ersuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and
friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought
only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and
that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this
Treaty . . .
Have decided to conclude a Treaty;
Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in
their relations with one another.
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
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Despite these efforts, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had its shortcomings.
The prohibition of war, for instance, failed to be linked to a system of
sanctions. Its preamble simply declared that a state violating the Pact
“should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty.” An even more
serious deficiency was the Pact’s failure to outlaw the use of force in
general, as well as war. The Pact was eventually ratified by sixty-two
states, and made an exception for self-defence, but failed to define it—
with the result that the customary criteria set out in the Caroline case
remained the only legal bases for the use of force in international affairs.
Strong on principle but lacking an enforcement mechanism, the Pact was
doomed to have little practical effect,3 and the League of Nations’ authority was challenged and whittled by a series of aggressive acts carried
out by some of the then major powers (Japan, Italy and a resurgent Germany) during the mid- to late 1930s. The League’s utility was finally
terminated by the outbreak of World War II in 1939.4
It was only after the destruction of World War II that the UN, the UN
Charter, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established.5 The
primary purpose of the new organization was “to maintain international
Id.
3. The pact never made a meaningful contribution to international order, although it
was invoked in 1929 with some success when China and the U.S.S.R. reached a tense
moment over possession of the Chinese Eastern R.R. in Manchuria. Ultimately, however,
the pact proved to be meaningless, especially with the practice of waging undeclared
wars in the 1930s (e.g., the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion
of Ethiopia in 1935, and the German occupation of Austria in 1938). See generally
ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME 260 (Lewis P. Curtis ed., Yale Univ. Press
1952) (1968).
4. In 1945, six years after the start of World War II, the Axis Powers were on the verge
of total defeat and one of the blackest pages in human history was about to close. By May
1945, Hitler’s envisaged Thousand-Year Reich lay in ruins. By August, Japan was devastated, as the atomic bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed Japan’s receding hope of carrying on its war of conquest. World War II was the
most cruel and devastating conflict in history. In terms of lives lost, geographical extent, and
cities reduced to ashes, the struggle defies rational comprehension. Over 17 million combatants were killed, 27 million wounded and nearly 20 million captured or missing. Civilian
populations were more affected by this war than any other in the past. JACKSON NYAMUYA
MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM WORLD WAR I TO
THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2004).
5. The final step in making the UN Charter was taken at Yalta, in 1945, by the “Big
Three” (the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia) with victory in sight. All the
Allied States, great and small, were invited to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, which met in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare the final
instrument for the new international organization. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD
HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4–8 (3d ed. 1969).
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peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”6
Until the adoption of the UN Charter, there had been no customary
prohibition on the unilateral resort to force if circumstances warranted it,
and in many instruments states reserved the right to resort to force. While
customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation,
and retribution as legitimate responses, the UN sought to impose limitations on the unilateral use of force in resolving international disputes.
Under the UN Charter, the right of self-defence was the only included
exception to the prohibition of the use of force.7
Thus, the UN Charter introduced to international politics a radically
new notion: a general prohibition of the unilateral resort to force by
states,8 as encapsulated in its most authoritative form in Article 2(4). The
UN Charter identified the structural defect of the international political
system and created a network of institutions and procedures. Rather than
standing by itself, Article 2(4) was part and parcel of a complex security
system.9 Under the UN Charter, unilateral acts of force not characterized
as self-defence, regardless of motive, were made illegal.10 Individual or
collective self-defence became the cornerstone relating to use of force,
and, since then, has been invoked with regard to almost every use of external military force.11
However, during the Cold War, it was increasingly clear that terrorists
were using technology to “exploit the vulnerabilities of modern socie-

6. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. The “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals” were taken as
the basis for the discussions that were to lead to the UN Charter.
7. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
8. Various legal instruments have reinforced the prohibition of the use of force since
the adoption of the UN Charter. These include: Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League,
reaffirmed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947; Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota
Charter), article 5 condemns aggression, article 15 forbids intervention, and article 18
prohibits use of force except in self-defence; the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence
(known as Pancha Sila), first formulated in April 29, 1954 between India and the PRC;
the final communiqué of the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung of April 24, 1955 which
gave approval to ten principles as the basis for promotion of world peace and cooperation.
9. The Charter included provisions for collective and regional defence arrangements,
and provisions on self-defence.
10. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39–51.
11. See Jackson Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror and the
Notion of Anticipating the Enemy, 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
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ties.”12 With citizens tending to live, work, and travel in close proximity
providing concentrated targets, modern societies are particularly susceptible to large-scale attacks and weapons of mass destruction.13 This fact
was not lost on perpetrators of terrorism, as witnessed by its growing
capabilities and lethalness throughout the Cold War era.14 The United
States and Israel led the way in seeking to co-opt use of military force as
a countermeasure against terrorism. The stance of the United States of
“passive, reactive and patient defense” to terrorism in the early 1970s
shifted to a “no compromise and very proactive approach” in the early
1980s, encapsulated in the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines.”15 Subsequent U.S. presidents have relied on a similar tenet of swift, effective
retribution to counter terrorism, often wrapping it up together with the
right of anticipatory self-defence.
Though terrorism has always been high on the international agenda, it
was the attacks on September 11, 2001 that brought the issue of terrorism
and the international regime on the use of force into a new, urgent, and
sustained debate. The magnitude of the September 11th attacks went beyond terrorism as it was known, and statements from various capitals
around the world pointed to a need to develop new strategies to confront
a new reality. The attacks had seemingly generated the momentum for
the international legal system to formally co-opt military response to
counter-terrorism within the regime of lawful force contained in the UN
Charter.
The Bush administration prepared the ground for pre-emptive attacks
by seeking to engage the accepted right of self-defence as a justification
for military action against rogue states. Because of the new threats, the
United States claimed, a proper understanding of the right of self-defence
should now extend to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential
aggressors, cutting them off before they would be able to launch strikes
that might be devastating in their scale and scope.16 This aggressive ap12. Id. at 4.
13. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 4 (1999).
14. Id. at 6 (stating that between 1970 and 1995, on average, each year brought 206
more incidents and 441 more fatalities).
15. Shirlyce Manning, The United States’ Response to International Air Safety, 61 J.
AIR L. & COM. 505, 519 (1996); see Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western
Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM 307, 316 (Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid eds., 1993).
16. The U.S. government’s position is encapsulated in the West Point Commencement Address on June 1, 2002 and officially articulated in the NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY, released in September 2002. See George W. Bush, West Point Commencement Address (June 1, 2002) (announcing an expansive new policy of preemptive mili-

410

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

proach became a central tenet of the United States’ strategic posture
known as the “Bush Doctrine.”17 Like the aggressive national policies
before it, the “Bush Doctrine” seeks to “effectively clos[e] down dangerous regimes before they become imminent threats”18 and, thus, represents
a usurpation of the Security Council’s role in global affairs.
This Article commences with an overview of the UN Charter regime
on the use of military force. It then proceeds to tackle its central theme
—an examination of the genesis of the current U.S. policy of proactive
action through military force to counter terrorism. Overall, the Article is
premised on the theme that the right to self-defence is visibly enrolled in
a process of change and evaluates this process within the uncertain and
indeterminate framework of state practice and the legal regime articulated in the UN Charter. The focal point of state practice in the Article is
the United States, which has long sought to articulate, through official
policy, use of force as a counter-terrorism measure. Though a handful of
states (especially Israel) have treaded this path, it is the United States that
has sought to articulate it as part of government policy.
II. USE OF FORCE AND THE UN CHARTER
Despite a general prohibition of force, the UN Charter recognizes that
force may be necessary to restore order, and that states are entitled to
defend themselves against aggression.19 This right is “inherent,” and customary international law is the yardstick upon which the degree and

tary action) [hereinafter West Point Commencement Address]; THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss/pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
17. The “Bush Doctrine” is the term that is now widely used by journalists, scholars
and politicians alike to describe the pre-emption strategy championed by Paul Wolfowitz,
Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy. See Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors,
Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html (“Wolfowitz’s ‘Defense Planning Guidance’ draft
argue[d] for a new military and political strategy in a post-Cold War world. Containment,
it says, is a relic of the Cold War. America should talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use
its military power to preempt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . .”).
18. Anthony Dworkin, Introduction, Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive SelfDefense, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, June 1, 2004, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/
bush-intro.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). See also Eyal Benvenisti, Expert Analysis,
Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, June
1, 2004, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-benvenisti.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2006).
19. See U.N. Charter art. 51.

2006]

WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE

411

manner of self-help should be measured.20 In the face of the UN Security
Council’s inability to control the spread of international terrorism, debate
as to the status of previously accepted military responses under customary international law remains strong, and many states have urged for an
expansion of the legitimate use of force under the Charter.
A. Article 2(4): Proscription of Force
Article 2(3) of the Charter provides that “[a]ll members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”21 Article
2(4) elaborates on the need for peaceful resolution of disputes: “All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.”22
Article 2(4) is the provision on which present day jus ad bellum
hinges.23 The use of force in international relations proscribed in the article includes both war and other forcible measures short of war.24 Its significance has been emphasized by international law scholars who label it
“the cornerstone of this new regime” 25 that “promote[s] peace by prohib20. The UN Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
22. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”) (emphasis added).
23. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(noting that Article 2(4) articulates the “principle of the prohibition of force” in international relations and avoids the term “war”).
24. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
25. Bartram S. Brown, Special Project: Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1687–88 (2000).
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iting the use of force and protecting the sovereignty of the member
states”26 and “the heart of the United Nations Charter.”27 Undoubtedly,
the wording of Article 2(4) constitutes a considerable improvement when
compared with Article I of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In Article 2(4) the
use of force in general is prohibited, rather than only war as in the Kellog-Briand Pact. Furthermore, under the Charter, the prohibition is not
confined to the actual use of force but extends to the mere threat of
force.28 Finally, the prohibition is, at least in theory, safeguarded by a
system of collective sanctions against any offender.29
The terms “territorial integrity” and “political independence” include
most forms of armed force, and are not intended to restrict the scope of
Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force.30 Rather, the two given
modes of the use of force cover any possible kind of trans-frontier use of
armed force. Thus, an incursion into the territory of another state constitutes an infringement of Article 2(4), even if it is not intended to deprive
that state of part of its territory or if the invading troops are meant to
withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited operation. In other words, “integrity” has to be read as “inviolability,” proscribing any kind of forcible trespassing.31 Gaps that may possibly be left
by these terms are filled by the remaining clause in Article 2(4), which
outlaws the threat or use of force “in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.”32
Notably, under Article 2(4) the prohibition of interstate force is not applicable to UN members only. The provision forbids use of force by UN
members against any state. Recourse to force by non-member states is
dealt with in Article 2(6).33 Article 2(6) is a radical provision that seeks
to bind even non-signatories to the UN Charter in contravention of Arti26. Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B. U.
INT’L L.J. 195, 197 (1993).
27. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1620 (1984).
28. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Kellogg-Briand pact, supra note 1.
29. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51 (providing the Security Council with the right to
decide where there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and
permitting necessary action to address such acts; furthermore, the Charter provides the
rights of individual or collective self-defence).
30. Id.
31. Jackson Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law? The “Bush Doctrine” of Preemptive Strikes and the UN Charter on the Use of Force, 7 U.W. SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 33–
34 (2003).
32. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
33. Id. art. 2, para. 6.
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cle 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
states that an obligation inures on a third state only if it accepts the obligation in writing.34 However, as Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties sets forth, treaty norms may become binding on third
states as rules of customary international law.35 When conventional international law crystallizes as customary law, the norm which has its
genesis in a treaty becomes binding on a third state.
The principle of prohibition of the threat or the use of force, well enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, has been further elaborated by
several consensual law-making decisions of the UN General Assembly
including, in particular, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations36 and
the 1974 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression.37 The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, besides restating Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter,38 emphasizes that such threat or use of force “shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.”39
B. Article 51: The State’s Right to Respond in Self-Defence
Having proscribed forcible self-help, the UN Charter nevertheless
permits state actions that are reasonably necessary as self-defence in the
face of an “armed attack.”40 The starting point for any discussion on the
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 84, para. 1, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
35. Id. art. 38.
36. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
37. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142–43, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
38. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
39. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 123.
40. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 432–
33 (1963). Professor Brownlie has categorised several Article 51 exceptions to the restrictions on the use of force. They are as follows:
1. acts of self-defence;
2. acts of collective self-defence;
3. actions authorised by a competent international organ (e.g., the United Nations Security Council);
4. where treaties confer rights to intervene or where an ad hoc invitation or
consent is given by the territorial sovereign;
5. actions to terminate trespass;
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subject of self-defence is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that
“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”41 Although the
wording of the article appears clear—the right of self-defence is generated when an attack occurs, i.e., the attack must be occurring before the
use of force is legitimate—practice has shown that the picture can be
more complicated.
In particular, the use of the term “inherent” has polarized commentators and states.42 Though the Charter does not indicate what rights are
“inherent,” the inclusion of this term was considered significant enough
by the drafters of the Charter to warrant its inclusion when revising Article 51.43 The initial draft of Article 51 made no mention of this “inherent
right,” but it was changed to make the definition of self-defence acknowledge that right.44 Despite the ongoing debate, a major question remains whether the right of self-defence under Article 51 is limited to
cases of armed attack or whether there are other instances in which selfdefence may be available under Article 51. Two schools of thought have
developed with regard to the scope of Article 51: those who take the literal, or restrictive, approach and those who take the view that Article 51
is considerably broader than its terms.
1. The Restrictionist Approach
The Restrictionist approach cites the absolute prohibition of forcible
self-help, as set out in Article 2(4), subject only to the limited exception
contained in Article 51.45 Under this reading, the exception permits recourse to self-defence only when faced with actual “armed attack,” and
Article 51 does not contemplate anticipatory or pre-emptive actions by a
6. necessity arising from natural catastrophe; and
7. measures to protect the lives or property of a state’s nationals in a foreign
territory.
41. U.N. Charter art. 51.
42. See, e.g., MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232–
41(1961).
43. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 25.
44. RUTH B. RUSSELL ASSISTED BY JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UN
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1945, at 698–99 (1958).
45. JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 94–95 (1958).
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state so threatened.46 Rather, it requires a state to refrain from responding
with like force unless actively involved in repelling an armed attack.47 A
significant number of writers argue that an armed attack is the exclusive
circumstance in which the use of armed force is sanctioned under Article
51.48 In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to state that “the leading opinion among scholars” is that the right of self-defence in Article 51
does not extend beyond armed attack.49 Furthermore, the International
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case clearly stated that the right of
self-defence under Article 51 only accrues in the event of an armed attack.50 Also, it is a traditional requirement of self-defence that a triggering event justifying a military response has already occurred or at least
be imminent.51
Restrictionists argue that by the time of the drafting of the UN Charter,
“self-defense was understood to be justified only in case of an attack by
the forces of a state.”52 Professor Brownlie notes that if Article 51 of the
UN Charter is the authoritative definition of the right of self-defence and
it is not qualified or supplemented by the customary law, then states are
bound by the black-letter law of the Charter and have less extensive
grounds to support armed force undertaken outside the framework of the
UN Charter.53
Though the Charter “may be regarded as objective or general international law,”54 most recognized independent states have expressly accepted the principles and obligations of the Charter.55 Furthermore, the
“provisions of the Charter have had strong influence on state practice

46. U.N. Charter art. 51.
47. STONE, supra note 45.
48. See, e.g.,YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 168 (3d ed.
2001). Dinstein concludes that the choice of words in Article 51 was deliberately restrictive and that the right to self-defence was limited to an armed attack.
49. Id. at 168. See also Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of U.S. Military Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 18 (1985).
50. In paragraph 195 of its Opinion, the Court said that the exercise of the right of
self-defence by a state under Article 51 “is subject to the state concerned having been the
victim of an armed attack.” Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
51. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 91–92 (1992).
52. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 280.
53. Id. at 279.
54. Id. at 280.
55. Id. at 280.
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since 1945, and the terms of Article 51 or very similar terms, have appeared in several important multilateral treaties and draft instruments.”56
2. The Counter-Restrictionist Approach
The Counter-Restrictionist approach adopts an expansionist view. Proponents interpret the Charter to recognize and include those rights of
self-defence that existed under customary international law prior to its
drafting.57 Oliver Schacter concisely states this position thus:
On one reading [of Article 51] this means that self-defense is limited to
cases of armed attack. An alternative reading holds that since the article
is silent as to the right of self-defense under customary law (which goes
beyond cases of armed attack), it should not be construed by implication to eliminate that right . . . . It is therefore not implausible to interpret Article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defense as it existed prior to the Charter.58

Customary law traditionally recognized a limited right of pre-emptive
self-defence according to the “Caroline criteria”:59 the necessity of selfdefence “must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment of deliberation” and the action taken must not be “unreasonable or excessive.”60 Martti Koskenniemi notes that the right of selfdefence articulated in the UN Charter “should be read rationally against
56. Id. Thus, article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947
provided for individual or collective self-defence in case of an “armed attack.” InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature Sept. 2, 1947, 62 U.S.T.
1681, 324 U.N.T.S. 21 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1948). Though articles 18 and 25 of the
Bogotá Charter are primarily concerned with reaction to the use of force, the latter article
refers ambiguously to “an act of aggression that is not an armed attack” and is concerned
only with the application of “measures and procedures,” whilst the former merely refers
to “the case of self-defence in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfilment thereof.”
Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 18, 25, opened for signature Apr.
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 1609 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec.13, 1951). The Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949, provides in article 12 that “[e]very State has the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack.” International Law Commission, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States art. 12, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/
texts/declar.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
57. See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Legality of State Response to Acts of Terrorism, in
TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 133, 137–38 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
58. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633–34.
59. Michael Byers, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bushbyers.html.
60. Id.
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some useful purpose that the rule serves . . . .”61 Koskenniemi argues that
the purpose of Article 51 was “to protect the sovereignty and the independence of the state,”62 and that if a state feels its sovereignty and independence threatened by the actions of another country, it might be entitled to use force against that country, even if the country’s hostile actions
had not yet risen to the level of an actual armed attack.63 CounterRestrictionist advocates hold the view that Article 2(4) left the right of
self-defence unimpaired and that the right implicitly accepted was not
confined to reaction to “armed attack” within Article 51 but permitted
the protection of certain substantive rights:
Action undertaken for the purpose of, and limited to, the defense of a
state’s political independence, territorial integrity, the lives and property of its nationals (and even to protect its economic independence)
cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of any other state.64

In line with Counter-Restrictionist proponents, it can be said that apart
from the restrictive phrases in Article 2(4), Article 51 and Article 2(4)
were not intended to, and do not, restrict the right of member states to
use force in self-defence as defined by customary international law. According to this position, Article 51 refers merely to “armed attack” because it was inserted for the particular purpose of clarifying the position
of defence treaties which are concerned only with external attack.65
Therefore, despite apparent specificity, the Charter leaves the broader
customary right, which is always implicitly reserved, intact.
3. Anticipatory Self-Defence
Contrary to the permissive and expansive reading of the Charter by
some scholars, international opinion on the impermissibility of anticipatory self-defence was never clearer than Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq.66
Fearing that it might eventually be a target of Iraq’s efforts to develop
nuclear weaponry, Israel reduced Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to rub61. Martti Koskenniemi, Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bushkoskenniemi.html.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185–86 (1958).
65. See Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 26.
66. The United Nations Security Council condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in a unanimous resolution adopted on June 19, 1981. S.C. Res. 487, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
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ble.67 Israel argued vehemently that the attack was justified based on the
right of anticipatory self-defence.68 The world was outraged and rose up
in one voice to condemn the act.
The world was outraged by Israel’s raid on June 7 1981. “Armed attack
in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach
of international law,” Margaret Thatcher thundered. Jeane Kirkpatrick,
the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain’s then
prime minister, described it as “shocking” and compared it to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome.
“Israel’s sneak attack . . . was an act of inexcusable and shortsighted
aggression,” said the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times called it
“state-sponsored terrorism”.
The greatest anger erupted at the UN. Israel claimed Saddam Hussein
was trying to develop nuclear weapons and it was acting in selfdefense, which is legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Other countries did not agree. They saw no evidence that Iraq’s nuclear energy
programme, then in its infancy and certified by the International
Atomic Energy Agency as peaceful, could be described as military, aggressive or directed against a particular country. In any case, preemptive action by one country against another country which offers no
imminent threat is illegal.69

The Security Council condemned Israel’s bombing of the Osirak reactor and unanimously passed Resolution 487, strongly denouncing the
Israeli action as illegal.70 In addition to condemning the attack, the
United States, under the authority of the Arms Control Act of 1968, suspended arms shipments to Israel on the grounds that those arms were to
be used for defensive purposes only.71 Invoking the standards of customary international law in general, and the Caroline factors in particular,
the international community’s opposition to the bombing as self-defence

67. Judith Miller, Was Iraq Planning to Make the Bomb? Debates by Experts Seems
Inconclusive, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1981, at A11.
68. Excerpts from Speech by Israeli Delegate to UN, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1981, at 15
(quoting Jehuda Blum, Israeli Delegate to the United Nations, Speech Before the Security
Council on June 19, 1981).
69. Jonathan Steele, The Bush Doctrine Makes Nonsense of the UN Charter,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 7, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/
0,7369,728870,00.html.
70. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981). This was especially compelling given that the United States was a party to the resolution. See id.
71. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2572 (2000).
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was based on the fact that the Iraqi threats, as well as their construction
of the reactor, did not amount to an “armed attack” on Israel.72
Politicians, policymakers, and the world at large were unanimous in
sensing that Israel’s pre-emptive strike was taking the world down a
slippery slope.73 If pre-emption was accepted as legal, the fragile structure of international peace would be undermined. Any state could attack
another under the pretext that it detected a threat, however distant. Notwithstanding the clear position taken by the Security Council and the
international community, the parameters of a state’s “inherent” right to
defend against armed attack is far from settled.
C. Reprisals and the UN Charter
In the heyday of anticipatory self-defence, states dealt with each other
on the basis of reciprocity.74 There were no supranational institutions to
make or enforce international law. States had the right to retaliate against
states that failed to honor bilateral or multilateral arrangements through
use of reprisals (retaliation by force) in ways that would otherwise have
been considered illegal. “In the absence of a supranational authority, this
72. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at paras. 115, 299, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288
(June 19, 1981). It is notable that in this, as well as later Security Council condemnations
of Israeli action, the premeditation evident in the military operation was considered an
argument against accepting the offered justification of self-defence. For example the
Security Council also condemned the 1985 attack by Israeli F-16s on the PLO Headquarters located in Tunisia, by a vote of 14-0, with the United States abstaining. S.C. Res.
573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985).
73. Paul Lewis, The UN’s Nuclear Cops Cover a Tough Bear, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1981, at D3.
74. Reciprocity was fundamental to the international law regime on the use of war in
its formative stages in the sense that rules were recognized to be binding legal obligations
owing to the centrality of war as a legal sanction. In all instances that armed conflict
arose, states routinely claimed legitimacy of armed measures on the enforcement of some
international obligation or entitlement. The ever-present possibility of war and the measures taken by states to prepare for and carry out military security meant that that the apprehension of discord and hostility between the States championed self-interest. The relationship between the balance of power and the law of nations was intimately tied in with
the balance of power system as a part of the law of nations. States could punish another
state that threatened the balance, and armed attack, in whatever context, triggered all the
rights of self-preservation. International law was in essence primarily enforced through
reciprocal entitlement violations (underpinned by military force)—if state A violated an
entitlement of state B, state B was justified in violating an entitlement of state A. However, development of military technology exposed the danger of potential escalations of
entitlement violations leading to international anarchy, hence the need to replace politics
with legal principles as the yardstick for governing war or resort to war. See HEDLEY
BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (2d ed. 1995).
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form of self-help was a way for states to get compensation for their
losses, punish their offenders, and deter future violations.”75
The purpose of international bodies such as the League of Nations and
the United Nations was to limit this use of force, and to provide a forum
for the resolution of conflict in international matters so as to prevent the
need for war. The text of the UN Charter reflects this intent and represents a conventional rejection of the just war theories of retribution; to
permit reprisals would thwart the very goal to which states have committed themselves by membership in the United Nations.76
Many commentators believe retaliation and reprisals to be illegal under
the UN Charter, citing the specific language of Articles 2 and 51.77
Taken together, Articles 2 and 51 comprise a minimum order in the sense
that they protect only the primary interest in freedom from aggression
and the right of self-defence.78 “The provisions of the Charter relating to
the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-resort to the use of force are
universally regarded as prohibiting reprisals which involve the use of
force.”79 These authorities conclude that the UN Charter requires states
to settle disputes peacefully under Article 2(3) and prohibits all forms of
forcible self-help other than the exercise of self-defence within the meaning of Article 51.
The Security Council expressed its view of the status of reprisals in
1964 when it censured Great Britain for carrying out a reprisal against
the Yemeni town of Harib in retaliation for alleged Yemeni support of
the anti-colonial struggle in Aden.80 After several Yemeni attacks on the
South Arabian Federation, the British commenced air attacks on Yemen
in 1964.81 The United Kingdom Representative, after discussing the series of Yemeni attacks, stated:

75. Stéphanie Giry, New World, Old Law: Would a Unilateral Strike Against Iraq
Ever Have Been Legal?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./ Feb. 2003, at 21.
76. See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: SelfDefence and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243, 286 (1987). In the
case of Israel, however, the United States has sometimes insisted, before condemning a
reprisal by Israel, that the terrorist act that prompted the reprisal also be condemned. William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defence in Counterterror Operations,
30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 433 (1990).
77. Roberts, supra note 76, at 282.
78. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 42, at 121–24.
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 281.
80. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32.
81. Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L.
1, 8 (1972).
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It will also be abundantly plain that, contrary to what a number of
speakers have said or implied, this action was not retaliation or a reprisal . . . . There is, in existing law, a clear distinction to be drawn between two forms of self-help. One, which is of a retributive or punitive
nature, is termed “retaliation” or “reprisals;” the other, which is expressly contemplated and authorized by the Charter, is self-defense
against armed attack . . . it is clear that the use of armed force to repel
or prevent an attack—i.e. legitimate action of a defensive nature—may
sometimes have to take the form of a counter-attack.82

Despite the United Kingdom Representative’s delicate attempt to cloak
the reprisals in the acceptable language of self-defence, the Security
Council refused to be hoodwinked, denounced the actions as reprisals,
and “deplore[d]” the British action.83 By a vote of 9-0, with two abstentions, the Security Council determined that it “[c]ondemns reprisals as
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”84
The Council’s rationale was that the members of the United Nations contracted not to use force to achieve solutions to international controversies.85 A reprisal, not considered as the use of force in self-defence, was,
therefore, considered an illegal use of force.86 Clearly the Security Council took the dominant restrictionist view in international law in rejecting
the legitimacy of any reprisal or anticipatory self-defence.
“This de jure prohibition on reprisal found its way into documentary
form in 1970”87 when the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the UN Charter was adopted.88 The Declaration on Friendly
Relations tenor was emphatic that members of the United Nations have
legally renounced the use of peacetime reprisals.89 The first principle

82. U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1109th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc S/PV.1109 (Apr. 7, 1964).
83. S.C. Res. 188, para. 7, U.N. Doc S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964).
84. Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM.
J. INT’L L. 415, 429 (1969).
85. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to
International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J.
1063, 1063–64 (1958).
86. Falk, supra note 84, at 429.
87. See Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1,
13 (2003).
88. Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban
on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 489 (1999).
89. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 121–24.

422

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

provides that “[s]tates shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”90 One of the duties imposed under this
principle is to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.91
On its face, the Declaration on Friendly Relations seems to flatly reject
the use of reprisals under all circumstances. This assertion is borne out
by subsequent condemnations of reprisals by the international community. In 1972, in reaction to constant terrorist attacks by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) elements based in neighboring Lebanon, it reminded and in the same breath warned Lebanon that it had an international legal obligation to prevent its territory from being used as a base
for armed attacks against Israel by the PLO.92 A few weeks later on February 25, 1972, Israel sent forces, tanks, armored cars, heavy artillery,
and air support into Lebanon to attack PLO bases.93 In response, the Security Council issued Resolution 313. When debating Resolution 313,
France denounced “these intolerable reprisals.”94 The final Resolution
did not mince words demanding “that Israel immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and forthwith withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese territory.”95 Israel
adopted a blasé attitude towards this Resolution and was soon back in
Lebanon attacking PLO bases. The Security Council was once again
seized of the matter. Belgium stated that “[t]he Belgian Government has
never ceased to repudiate energetically the military reprisal actions undertaken by Israel against Lebanon.”96 The final Resolution of June 26,
1972 denounced Israel’s actions as violating the UN Charter.97
About a decade later, on December 27, 1985, simultaneous bombings
of airline offices in Rome and Vienna left twenty innocent people dead,
including five Americans, with over eighty people injured.98 Four months
later on April 5, 1986, a bomb explosion in a West German discotheque
frequented by American servicemen killed two American servicemen

90. Id. at 122.
91. Id. at 123.
92. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 426–27.
93. Id. at 427.
94. Id. at 436 n.87.
95. S.C. Res. 313, para. 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/313 (Feb. 28, 1972).
96. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 436 n.87.
97. Id. at 427–28.
98. Lary Rohter, Airlines Say They had Warnings About Possible Move by Terrorists,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1985, at A1.
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and wounded 154 persons—fifty to sixty were Americans.99 In both instances, intelligence traced the perpetrators back to Libya. In the early
hours of April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and Naval aircraft simultaneously bombed targets in Libya. Despite the positive reaction from the
U.S. Congress,100 both the Security Council and General Assembly condemned the U.S. attacks. While the Resolution to condemn the attack by
the Security Council failed owing to vetoes by the United States, United
Kingdom, and France, the vote in the General Assembly was successful.
However, the clear stance of the international community on the legality of reprisals wavered in the late 1980s. Beginning in July 1987, during
the course of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States conducted escort operations of tankers in the Gulf. After months of volatility and gunboat
diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, on April 14, 1988 Iranian submarine
mines damaged a U.S. naval ship. Four days later, the United States retaliated with attacks that decimated two Iranian oil platforms.101 The next
day, President Reagan stated that the United States’ action was “to make
certain the Iranians have no illusions about the cost of irresponsible behavior.”102 The Reagan administration claimed the strike was in “retaliation”103 for mine laying by Iran and that “any further mining by Iran
would bring harsher military reprisals.”104 In this instance:
There was no Security Council debate on these hostilities. In some
cases, the U.S. forces clearly acted in self-defense. In other cases, as in
the retaliatory strikes of October 19, 1987 and April 18, 1988, U.S. attacks were not immediate. These actions could easily be characterized
as preventive, deterrent measures and, just as readily, as punitive measures.105

The seeming indifference by the United Nations in this instance, buttressed by other subsequent incidents, forms the basis of the view that the
Charter does not prohibit reprisals entirely. In the late 1980s, the General
99. John Tagliabue, 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, at A1.
100. Gerald M. Boyd, Genesis of a Decision; How the President Approved Retaliatory
Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1986, at A11.
101. David Hoffman & Lou Cannon, U.S. Retaliates, Hits Iran Oil Platforms in Gulf,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1988, at A1.
102. John H. Cushman Jr., U.S. Strikes 2 Iranian Oil Rigs and Hits 6 Warships in Battles Over Mining Sea Lanes in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1988, at A10.
103. Major Phillip A. Seymour, The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool
against State-Sponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 221, 224 (1990).
104. Hoffman & Cannon, supra note 101, at A1.
105. O’Brien, supra note 76, at 427.
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Assembly and the Security Council appear to have adopted a policy inconsistent with their spoken opposition to reprisals.106 The Council has
generally not condemned acts of reprisal which it considered “reasonable,” while voting to condemn actions considered excessive or disproportionate.107 In so doing, the Council has appeared to indicate its tolerance of some proportional acts of reprisal. As one scholar observes:
There is, however, a contrary view that the Charter does not prohibit
forcible self-help, i.e., reprisals entirely. An argument can be made that
resorts to reprisals are both legal and desirable under the Charter. First,
Security Council practice implies the recognition of the legitimacy of
some type of reasonable reprisal. There is an inconsistency between the
Security Council’s alleged principle of the illegality of all armed reprisals and the Council’s practice in not condemning a particular reprisal
because it appeared reasonable. A practice of condemning only unreasonable or disproportionate reprisals is, in effect, an affirmation of the
right of states to resort to reasonable reprisals.108

Therefore, under recent UN practices, the status of reprisals may be
viewed as illegal de jure but accepted de facto, provided they meet the
requirement of proportionality. The troubling question of whether any
other forcible form of self-help outside of self-defence is permitted under
the Charter thus persists.109
Having canvassed the various avenues regarding the use of force, the
author resists the temptation to move straight to the matter of the use of
force and terrorism without addressing the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention. Though this does not strike a direct chord with the
central theme of the Article, the most explicit form of unilateral action in
the post-UN Charter era without UN authority has been premised in large
part on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Vestiges of this doctrine have an increasing resonance in the plethora of justifications for the
unilateral decision by the United States at the head of the “Coalition of
the Willing” to invade Iraq in 2003 without explicit UN authority.110 It is

106. Not all acts of reprisal result in Security Council condemnation. See Barry Levenfield, Israel’s Counter Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal under
Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 35 (1982).
107. Id.
108. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32–33.
109. U.N. Charter art. 51.
110. Christopher Hobson notes:
With America’s primary claims for invading Iraq—weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and links to terrorism—being largely discredited, bringing de-
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therefore only appropriate that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
gets mention.
D. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter
It is significant that under the UN Charter, the third explicit exception
to the general prohibition on the use of force, found in Chapter VIII of
the Charter, permits actions undertaken by “regional arrangements or
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.”111 Significantly, this is not a carte
blanche, since regional alliances may undertake any action in this regard
that is “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”112
In general, humanitarian intervention entails a unilateral or multilateral
intervention by a foreign power in a third country in reaction to serious
and systematic violations of human rights by the government. Prior to the
twentieth century, a general custom and practice of humanitarian intervention existed.113 The legal doctrine finds scholarly support as early as
the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius wrote that “where [tyrants]
. . . provoke their own people to despair and resistance by unheard of
cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose
the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of nations.”114 This historical doctrine is strengthened by
an emerging notion of a duty to protect civilians that has its genesis in
the horrors of post-World War II.

mocracy to the country has increasingly become the central justification by
President Bush and his supporters for overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Christopher Hobson, A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East: U.S. Democracy Promotion and the “War on Terror,” 59 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 39, 40 (2005).
111. U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
112. Id.
113. See David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 258–59 (1992).
114. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 288 (A.C. Campbell trans.,
1979) (1901). John J. Merriam notes:
Proponents of intervention . . . cite the British, French, and Russian intervention in Greece (1827–1830), the Russian intervention in Turkey (1877–1878),
and the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb intervention in Macedonia (1903) as examples of humanitarian interventions that were regarded as legal operations.
John J. Merriam, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 111, 119 (2001).
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For almost the entire history of the UN, it has recognized that certain
human rights violations are beyond the pale of state sovereignty and
constitute a threat to peace and security. Consequently, proponents of
humanitarian intervention argue that the UN has endorsed the notion
that sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human right to
life.115

However, the matter of humanitarian intervention in the post-UN Charter era was brought strongly to the fore with NATO’s reaction to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by Serbian forces.116 On March 24, 1999, without the benefit of a UN Security Council resolution expressly authorizing
military action, NATO began a seventy-eight day air campaign over the
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).117 The Kosovo operation was
preceded by months of diplomatic efforts to resolve the region’s problems peacefully. The United Nations, OSCE, NATO, and the United
States all participated in a multitude of diplomatic moves aimed at curbing the violence and reaching a political solution. “The legal debate over
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been posed as a tension between two competing principles: respect for the ‘territorial integrity’ and
‘political independence’ of states and the guarantees for human rights
. . . .”118
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue that the use of force
against a sovereign state violates the most imperative international legal
norms, not to mention the UN Charter.119
The major argument against a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention is that it would open the door to “pretextual” intervention . . . this
115. Id. at 122.
116. It should of course be noted that there have been previous acts premised on some
form of pseudo-humanitarian intervention, but this has been largely within the framework
of UN authorisation. One need only recall the acts in relation to the first Gulf War and the
no fly zone, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor. Though these actions may sit uncomfortably within the UN regime on the use of force, they nonetheless found some sort of legitimacy via subsequent Security Council resolutions. For a concise overview of these military operations, see Jackson Maogoto, People First, Nations Second: A New Role for the
UN as an Assertive Human Rights Custodian, AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 120, 133–38 (2000).
117. The operation’s objective was “to degrade and damage the military and security
structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.” William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Prepared Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/.
118. Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons
from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1752 (2000).
119. See Merriam, supra note 114, at 119–21.
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legal doctrine is founded in the custom and practice of states, and because it is so controversial, there has never been a universally accepted
standard established for regulating and evaluating humanitarian interventions. Whatever standard exists is only that which can be drawn
from the past practice of intervening states, and as such is vague and
malleable.120

Proponents of the doctrine argue that despite the general prohibition on
the use of force encapsulated in the UN Charter, a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention survives, embodied in the custom and practice of
state actors in the international arena.121 This argument is based in large
part on the fact that the United Nations was formed to prevent the use of
force as a means of settling disputes and to protect universal human
rights.122 “Some states have opted to use force as a means of last resort to
prevent humanitarian tragedy, while at the same time seeking to establish
a self-defense argument in order to avoid UN sanction.”123 Traction for
this argument can also be found in the observation that the UN Charter
not only permits intervention on humanitarian grounds, it requires it in
cases of gross and systemic human rights abuses.124 Articles 55 and 56 of
the UN Charter implore “[a]ll Members [to] pledge themselves to take
joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
. . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”125
A key point that undermined NATO’s claims that the Kosovo action
was a permissible use of force was the foggy and often incoherent
grounds it provided as justification. Despite its seemingly humanitarian
dimensions, the Kosovo action was not a textbook example of the doctrine, and was dressed up with other justifications at odds with the central
ground of humanitarian intervention. Professor Julie Mertus notes:

120. Id. at 126.
121. See generally David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992) (providing a comprehensive examination of
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
122. See Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117, 124 (1993).
123. Merriam, supra note 114, at 114.
124. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie
and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
229, 231–2 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (discussing several instances in which interventions occurred for humanitarian purposes).
125. U.N. Charter arts. 55, para. (c), 56.
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NATO did not act only in the name of human rights. Instead, leaders of
NATO countries offered a cafeteria of justifications for their actions.
The Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions in
Kosovo solely on humanitarian rights grounds. Instead, the Administration offered an array of justifications. Humanitarian concerns were
rolled together with other factors: the need for regional stabilization,
the stemming of refugee flows, and the need to protect NATO’s reputation.126

Mertus goes on to note that “by failing to specify clearly the legal parameters of their actions, the NATO allies exposed themselves to criticism suggesting that NATO was not operating under any legal grounds at
all.” 127 Mertus follows this concern by noting that by failing to provide
clear legal justifications for intervention on human rights grounds, human rights advocates opened themselves up to similar criticism that they
were outside the law.
As this part of the Article has shown, the vagueness and confusion of
conceptual elements and malleable past precedent clouds the UN Charter
regime on the use of force. Having canvassed the various avenues regarding the use of force, the Article now turns to consider the use of
military force as a counter-measure against terrorism in view of the fact
that it is generally held to be inconsistent with the UN Charter regime on
the use of force.
III. THE COLD WAR ERA: TERRORIST ACTION AND REACTION
During the Cold War Era, increased terrorist attacks focused attention
on the capabilities of elite forces trained for anti-terrorist operations. The
1976 Israeli hostage rescue at Entebbe in the aftermath of the hijacking
of Air France Flight 139 marked the opening salvo in the use of military
force to counter terrorism.129 About three years later, on November 4,
1979, a mob of Iranians seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking a
large group of employees hostage and sparking the Iranian hostage crisis.
126. Julie Mertus, The Imprint of Kosovo on the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 6
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 528 (2000).
127. See Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note
118, at 1748–49.
129. See generally YESHAYAHU BEN-PORAT, EITAN HABER & ZEEV SCHIFF, ENTEBBE
RESCUE (Louis Williams trans., Delacorte Press 1977) (1976) (providing an overview of
the Israeli hostage rescue in Entebbe).
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Five months later, the impotence of diplomatic efforts led the Carter administration to order a rescue effort by helicopter, but the mission was
aborted.130 In 1981, following the release of the Iranian Embassy hostages, Reagan warned that when the rules of international behavior are
violated, the U.S. policy would be one of “swift and effective retribution.”131 The Reagan administration was sending initial indications that a
hard line, conceivably involving the use of military force, would be taken
with terrorists in the future.
Two years later on April 18, 1983, sixty-three people were killed and
one hundred twenty were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.132 Six months later, on October 23, 1983, in another terrorist attack, a large Mercedes truck exploded with such terrific force that the headquarters of the First Battalion, Eighth Marine Regiment was instantly reduced to rubble with the
loss of 242 Americans.133 The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for
both attacks.134 The bombings precipitated renewed debate over whether
U.S. military forces were adequately prepared to deal with terrorism and
whether the United States would use force either in anticipation of, or in
response to, terrorism.
The Long Commission, in commenting upon the devastating attack on
the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut, concluded:
[S]tate sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of warfare and . . . adequate response to this increasing threat requires an active national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its effectiveness. The Commission further concludes that this policy needs to be
supported by political and diplomatic actions and by a wide range of
timely military response capabilities.135

The Long Commission report proved to be a turning point for U.S.
counter-terrorism policy. Despite definitional concerns and fundamental
issues concerning the kind of responses the United States could lawfully
130. See GARY SICK, OCTOBER SURPRISE: AMERICA’S HOSTAGES IN IRAN AND THE
ELECTION OF RONALD REAGAN 19–20 (1991).
131. Richard Halloran, Swift U.S. Retribution for Terrorists Called Doubtful, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1981, at B13.
132. U.S. Army, Timeline of Terrorism, http://www.army.mil/terrorism/19891980/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. U.S. Dep’t Defense., Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 129 (1983), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/
hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report.
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take within the rubric of international law, the United States had grown
tired of attacks against its interests and citizens and soon formally embraced military force against terrorist violence. In opting to use force, the
United States took the position that it was necessary to accept some risks
to ensure that every terrorist success attracted the military might of the
United States.136 From the position of the United States, deterrence was
premised on terrorists fearing a forceful response from the victim state.
A. New Frontiers on the Use of Force? Development of the Reagan and
Shultz Doctrines
On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), which assigned responsibility for developing
strategies to counter terrorism and made clear that, while use of all the
non-military options would be made, the United States was also prepared
to respond within the parameters set by the law of armed conflict. Defense Department official Noel Koch explained that the NSDD “represent[ed] a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode
to recognition that proactive steps [were] needed.”137 Significantly, the
document incorporated some key elements: the United States has a responsibility to take protective measures whenever evidence arises that
terrorism is about to be committed against U.S. interests; and the threat
of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and justifies acts in lawful
self-defence.138 With this directive, the ground was formally laid for the
“Reagan Doctrine” of swift, effective retribution.
The NSDD signaled that, as far as the executive branch was concerned,
the debate over whether military force was inside or outside the range of
counter-terrorism measures was over. Henceforth, the United States
would use military force in both pre-emptive and retaliatory scenarios.
Although then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had initially advocated only “an active defense” against terrorists,139 growing frustration
over the inability of the United States to effectively counter the accelerating frequency and violence of terrorist attacks prompted him to re-

136. Brian M. Jenkins, The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma, ARMED
FORCES J. INT’L, Apr. 1985, at 39, 44.
137. Robert C. Toth, Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed, WASH. POST, Apr. 16,
1984, at A19.
138. Robert C. McFarlane, Terrorism and the Future of Free Society, Speech Delivered at the Defence Strategy Forum (Mar. 25, 1985), in 8 TERRORISM 315, 321 (Yonah
Alexander ed., 1986).
139. Shultz Urges “Active” Drive on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1984, at A3.
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evaluate his views on the nature of appropriate responses to international
terrorism, further expanding the controversial new U.S. policy.
In late 1984 at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City, Shultz
asserted that the United States must be ready to use military force to fight
terrorism and retaliate even before all the facts are known.140 This was
the beginning of what later became known as the “Shultz Doctrine,” a
corollary of the “Reagan Doctrine.” Shultz predicted that the increased
terrorist attacks against strategic U.S. interests around the world in the
years ahead would necessitate a willingness to combat it using military
force.141 This signaled that an active policy of response by armed force to
terrorist attacks would be followed by the United States. In the same
speech, Shultz claimed a broad right on behalf of the United States to use
force against terrorist threats abroad, including a policy of pre-emptive
strikes in foreign countries.142 Although arguably effective and temporarily satisfying, the important concern was whether a policy of armed response was wise in view of its probable violation of international law.
The United States ran the risk of incurring the massive condemnation
that would accompany a policy of systematic use of armed force against
terrorist attacks and the possibility of being branded an international outlaw.143
Even as the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines” were forming, Israeli action was actively providing a practical manifestation of the tenet underlying these doctrines with regular military actions to counter terrorism outside its territory—in Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia—throughout the 1980s.
The U.S. position that “[a]s a matter of U.S. policy, retaliation against
terrorist attacks is a legitimate response and an expression of selfdefense”144 was practically expressed in 1985 by Israel. On October 1,
1985, six F-15 Israeli fighter-bombers unleashed a barrage of bombs on
the headquarters of the PLO in a suburb of Tunis, the capital of Tunisia,
responding to alleged terrorist attacks.145 Israel Defense Minister Yitzhak
140. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Terrorism and the Modern World, Address
Before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City (Oct. 25, 1984), printed in DEP’T
ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 12–17 [hereinafter Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World].
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id.
143. ERNEST EVANS, CALLING A TRUCE TO TERROR 122 (1979).
144. U.S. Supports Attack, Jordan and Egypt Vow to Press for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1985, at A1.
145. The Israeli attack by six F-15 fighter-bombers apparently left seventy men,
women and children dead and more than one hundred Tunisians and Palestinians
wounded. See Donald R. Morris, Cycle of Terrorism Will Continue with Retaliatory
Strikes, HOUS. POST, Jan. 2, 1986, at 2B.
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Rabin seemed to echo Reagan and Shultz when he stated: “[w]e decided
the time was right to deliver a blow to the headquarters of those who
make the decisions, plan and carry out terrorist activities.”146 The UN
Security Council was swift to vigorously condemn the act as a flagrant
violation of the UN Charter, international law, and norms of conduct.147
Three days after the attack, a single session of the Security Council produced Resolution 573 (with only one abstention by the United States),
which condemned the Israeli attack; demanded that Israel “refrain from
perpetrating such acts of aggression or from threatening to do so;” urged
member states to “dissuade Israel from resorting to such acts;” and supported Tunisia’s right to reparations.148
The international community in general condemned the Israeli Tunis
raid as an act of aggression and a violation of Tunisia’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.149 Israel’s argument of self-defence against terrorism
was dismissed.150 Israel’s attack and the U.S.’s subsequent support in the
face of vitriolic condemnation by most countries was symptomatic of the
revolution in policy that the United States was undertaking. The United
States abstained from the string of condemnations that followed every
Israeli action debated in the Security Council, and began to veto consideration of those resolutions, effectively ending discussion of the matter
within the Security Council.151 This change in U.S. reaction was not just
the result of a new, hawkish conservative administration; it was also a
response to the targeting of U.S. citizens and interests by state-sponsored
146. Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1985, at A8.
147. A resolution condemning the attacks was swiftly passed with a vote of 14-0, with
the United States abstaining. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985).
148. Id.
149. See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 151, 165–67 (1986)
(discussing resort to war and armed force).
150. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2615, supra note 144 (remarks made by Ambassadors Ononaiye,
Golob, Kusumaatmadja, Chamorro Mora, Wasiuddin, Shihabi, Zarif, and Le Kim
Chung).
151. The United States did not cast its first veto in favor of Israel until 1972. From
1967–1972, the United States supported or abstained on twenty-four resolutions, most
critical of Israel. From 1973–2003, the Security Council adopted approximately one hundred resolutions on the Middle East, again, most critical of Israel with the United States
vetoing a total of thirty-seven resolutions. Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, Myths & Facts
Online: The United Nations, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf13.
html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of voting
patterns in the Security Council on resolutions affecting and/or involving Israel, see
MITCHELL GEOFFREY BARD ET AL., MYTHS AND FACTS: A CONCISE RECORD OF THE ARABISRAELI CONFLICT (1992); HARRIS SCHOENBERG, MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE PLO (1989).
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terrorists. U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walter’s explanation of the U.S. abstention in the Security Council Resolution condemning Israel’s bombing
in Tunis is instructive:
[W]e recognize and strongly support the principle that a state subjected
to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of
force to defend against further attacks. This is an aspect of the inherent
right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations Charter.152

Two months after the Israeli counter-terrorist attacks, the U.S. frustration with the international regime on the use of force in countering terrorism was captured clearly by Secretary of State Shultz’s outburst:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing
terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the
soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from
using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or
guerrillas. International law requires no such result.153

With these words, Shultz laid down more building blocks for the
“Shultz Doctrine” and its highly controversial position advocating the
use of military force not only against terrorists, but also against states
that support, train, or harbor terrorists.154 This Doctrine was formally
fleshed out on January 15, 1986, in the Secretary’s speech on terrorism at
the National Defense University.155 In that speech, the Secretary added:
“a nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens, when no
other means is available.”156 This is so, the Secretary said, even though
others have “asserted that military action to retaliate or pre-empt terrorism is contrary to international law.”157
Worldwide opposition to the new policy was swift in coming. Surprisingly, even some senior officials in the U.S. State Department expressed

152. U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2615 (Oct. 4, 1985).
153. George Shultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of
Ambiguity, Address Before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference (Jan. 15, 1986), in 25
I.L.M. 204, 206 (1986). Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1986, at A1.
154. See Don Oberdorfer, Abraham Sofaer; State’s Legal Adviser Deals with Policy,
Then the Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1986, at A13.
155. Gwertzman, Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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reservations.158 U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, in charge
of the machinery that would be tasked with affecting the doctrine, opposed responsive military strikes that needlessly “kill women and children.”159 Additionally, Robert Oakley, Ambassador-at-Large for Counter
Terrorism, opined that the President’s Commission on Terrorism had
recommended that the United States not use military force to retaliate
against states supporting terrorists.160 International and domestic opposition in the United States was a result of a number of difficult issues
raised by the doctrine, and the difficult questions raised by the United
States’ new policy:
[I]s the responding coercion still a use of force in self-defense against
an armed “attack?” Is the responding coercion primarily pre-emptive,
retaliatory, or for the purpose of imposing sanctions against a violation
of international law? And if among the latter, are any of these forms of
responsive coercion ever permissible?161

The United States was determined not to back down, and a few weeks
after Shultz had fleshed out his doctrine, the Vice President’s Task Force
on Combating Terrorism found: “Terrorism has become another means
of conducting foreign affairs. Such terrorists are agents whose association the state can easily deny. Use of terrorism by the country entails few
risks, and constitutes strong-arm, low-budget foreign policy.”162 This
statement echoed the Reagan administration’s concerns over new and
unconventional challenges to U.S. foreign policy in critical areas of the
world.
Though it was evident that this threat of low-intensity conflict raised a
host of new legal, political, military, and moral issues, it was not long
before the United States demonstrated that it was not overly concerned
with the questions that its new policy engendered and that the “Reagan”
and “Shultz Doctrines” were not just hollow rhetoric. On April 5, 1986,
Le Belle discotheque in West Germany, a spot popular with off-duty
American servicemen, was bombed, leaving two Americans dead and

158. See, e.g., Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz and Weinberger Disagree on Using Force
Against Libyans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1986, at A1.
159. See Task Force Supports U.S. Policy on Global Terrorism, Official Says, HOUS.
POST, Mar. 2, 1986, at 13A.
160. See id.
161. Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of
Force Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 711, 716 (1986).
162. Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, Feb.
1986, at 2, available at http://www.population-security.org/bush_and_terror.pdf.
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over 154 persons injured.163 U.S. intelligence indicated Libya sponsored
this terrorist attack.164 President Reagan responded to this threat by
bombing military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya on April 14,
1986.165 The attack was met with condemnation.166 Critics claimed the
time lapse and proportionally of the attacks, as well as the choice of targets undermined the primary justification of self-defence.167 As Major
Phillip A. Seymour notes:
Although President Reagan cited self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter as the legal basis for the air strike, his explanation implicitly included retaliation (i.e., reprisal) as an additional justification . . . .
In deciding to use military force against Libya, deterrence certainly was
a major, if not the primary, consideration . . . . This interpretation is
supported by then-Vice President George Bush’s comments a month
prior to the Libyan raid when he stated that American policy in combating terrorism would be one of a willingness to “retaliate.”168

The Tripoli bombing was far from a one off event; it was part of a
crystallizing U.S. policy. This was despite the fact that international law
relating to self-defence did not accord with the American viewpoint. The
United States seemed determined to co-opt the use of military force
against terrorism within the infirm concept of anticipatory self-defence.
Two years after the air raid on Tripoli, on December 21, 1988, while
cruising at an altitude of 31,000 feet, Pan American Flight 103 (Flight
103) exploded in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland.169 Two hundred
fifty-eight passengers and crew died in the explosion; another seventeen
townspeople died on the ground as a result of the fiery debris.170 Presi163. 2d U.S. Soldier Dies from Bombing of Disco, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1986, at C8.
164. U.S. Exercises Right of Self–Defence Against Libyan Terrorism, DEP’T ST. BULL.,
June 1986, at 1, 8.
165. Bernard Weintraub, U.S. Calls Libya Raid a Success; “Choice is Theirs,” Reagan
Says; Moscow Cancels Shultz Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at A1.
166. See William F. Buckley, Libya: Reactions, NAT’L REV., May 23, 1986, at 54;
George J. Church, U.S. Bombers Strike at Libya’s Author of Terrorism, Dividing Europe
and Threatening a Rash of Retaliations, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 16; Steve Holland, West
Talked Tough, but Terrorists Weren’t Listening; Attacks in 1986 Took a Bloody Toll Despite Threats and Raid on Libya, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 17, 1986, at 2A; William V. Shannon, Thatcher’s Reservations, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1987, at A21. See
also Sir John Thompson, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2679th mtg., at 27, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2679 (1986) (Prime Minister Thatcher primarily concerned with proportionality).
167. See Kelly, supra note 87, at 17.
168. Seymour, supra note 103, at 223.
169. Russell Watson, An Explosion in the Sky, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1989, at 16.
170. Id. at 17.
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dent Reagan ordered an inquiry into the circumstances of the Flight 103
disaster and directed the preparation of a report intended to be “a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options with respect to preventing terrorist acts involving aviation.”171 Among the recommendations of the President’s Commission were “active measures—
pre-emptive or retaliatory, direct or covert—against a series of targets in
countries well-known to have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.”172
These recommendations reinforced the vitality of the “Reagan” and
“Shultz Doctrines” as part of the U.S. policy of pre-emption. It was,
however, not until the end of the Cold War that the United States had the
opportunity to fully pursue this new national policy.
IV. POST-COLD WAR: PROACTIVE ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM
In 1993, following the discovery of an Iraqi plot to assassinate then
U.S. President George Bush Sr. on a visit to Kuwait, the United States
fired twenty-three cruise missiles at Iraqi intelligence targets within
Iraq.173 Though the attack came after those involved in the plot in Kuwait
had been apprehended and President Bush had completed his planned
visit, the justification presented to Congress by the President was that the
action was within the right of self-defence under Article 51.174
The next significant case of American action to counter terrorism
through military action came on August 7, 1998 when U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, killing at least 252 (including twelve
U.S. citizens) and injuring more than five thousand. Secretary of State
Albright pledged to “use all means at our disposal to track down and
punish” those responsible.175 On August 20, 1998, the United States responded by launching seventy-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S.
warships.176 This attack was directed at an Osama bin Laden bankrolled
Al Qaeda terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharma171. Exec. Order No. 32,629, 54 Fed. Reg. 12,686 (Aug. 4, 1989).
172. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 125 (1990).
173. Jack M. Beard, Military Action against Terrorists Under International Law:
America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under International Law, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2002).
174. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters,
1 PUB. PAPERS 940 (June 28, 1993), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubapers/.
175. Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania:
A New Policy Direction? CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, Sept. 1, 1998, http://www2.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/crs19980901.pdf (last visited January 30, 2005).
176. W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to International Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 3, 47 (1999).
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ceutical plant177 that the Clinton administration suspected was producing
chemical weapon components with bin Laden’s funding.178
The American justification for their military action was based on both
reprisal and anticipatory self-defence.179 In his address to the nation, then
U.S. President Bill Clinton told the American people that the strikes
against the “terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan” were
necessary because of the “imminent threat they presented to [U.S.] national security.”180 Thus the Clinton administration, like the Reagan administration before it, justified its response to terrorist strikes by claiming self-defence. In a report sent to Congress, President Clinton claimed
that the strikes were justified under the “inherent right of self-defense
consistent with Article 51 . . .” and at the same time were intended to
“prevent and deter additional attacks . . . .”181 Moreover, President Clin-

177. Many critics later raised doubts about the quality of the evidence relied upon by
the Clinton Administration in its decision to strike the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant.
For a discussion of such doubts, see Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible
Responses to Terrorism, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 257–60 (2000).
178. See Maureen F. Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S. Response, and the Role of Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195 (1999). It
should be noted that Clinton’s reasons for striking Afghanistan and Sudan (in an effort to
reach bin Laden) are analogous to Reagan’s reasons for attacking Libya (in an effort to
reach Qadhafi). See O’Brien, supra note 76, at 463–65 (suggesting that the Reagan administration attacked Libya in 1986 as a reprisal for Qadhafi’s suspected support of terrorist attacks on U.S. targets). As Brennan explains:
[Though a]dmitting that the bin Laden terrorist “network” was not sponsored
by any state, Clinton outlined four reasons for the action: 1) overwhelming evidence showed bin Laden “played the key role in the embassy bombings”; 2) his
network had been responsible for past terrorist attacks against Americans; 3)
officials had “compelling information” that bin Laden was planning future attacks and 4) his organization was attempting to obtain chemical weapons. In a
second statement, President Clinton carefully characterized the strikes as necessary to defend against the threat of “imminent” and “immediate” future attacks,
and not as retribution or punishment.
See Brennan, supra, at 1195–96.
179. Remarks in Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/.
180. Address to the Nation on Military Action against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan
and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 20, 1998), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
pubpapers/.
181. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action against Terrorist
Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 21, 1998), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/.
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ton invoked the traditional Caroline requirements of imminence, necessity, and proportionality, claiming that all three had been met.182 Indeed,
when Bill Richardson, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
wrote the letter notifying the UN Security Council of the U.S. missile
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, he clearly laid out the U.S. arguments
in support of the attacks in the familiar language of self-defence.183 Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, went further by warning
terrorist organizations that the United States would not limit itself to
“passive defense” when faced with choosing either to “fight or fold in
pathetic cowardice . . . . ”184
Many of the same critiques of the Reagan administration’s bombing of
Libya in 1986 were lodged at the Clinton administration’s cruise missile
attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan, and many observers concluded that
the cruise missile attacks violated the rules of international law.185 Indeed, one commentator suggested that the Clinton administration foresaw this criticism: “The care with which . . . President [Clinton] and U.S.
officials characterized the justification for the missile attacks show[ed]

182. See id. at 1464.
183. Ambassador Richardson’s letter to the President of the UN Security Council,
dated August 20, 1998, stated in part:
These attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the Government of Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist
activities down and to cease their cooperation with the bin Laden organization.
That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that ‘strikes will continue from everywhere against American targets, and we have convincing evidence that further such attacks were in preparation from these same terrorist facilities. The United States, therefore, had no choice but to use armed force to
prevent these attacks from continuing. In doing so, the United States has acted
pursuant to the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations. The targets struck, and the timing and method of attack
used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law, including the rules of necessity and
proportionality.
Reisman, supra note 176, at 48–49 (quoting Letter from Bill Richardson, the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (Aug. 20,
1998)).
184. Scheideman, supra note 177, at 250.
185. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The
Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 557 (1999) (“. . . the August 20 missile strikes represent the assertion of imperial might and arrogance [by the
United States] in opposition to international law . . .”).
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their concern that the actions of the United States could be perceived as a
violation of international law.”186
In characterizing the cruise missile strikes as “retaliation rather than
legitimate self-defense,”187 critics took issue with the fact that the targets
of the attacks in both Afghanistan and Sudan had no direct link to any
“imminent” attack against the United States.188 Furthermore, it was
unlikely that the destruction of the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, and the leveling of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, met the proportionality requirement regulating uses of force in self-defence.189 Thus,
no matter how the Clinton administration chose to justify the attacks—
whether as retaliation or as self-defence—the equation simply did not
add up to an acceptable use of force under international law.190 Most notably,
this is the first time the U.S. has given such primary and public prominence to the preemptive, not just retaliatory, nature and motive of a
military strike against a terrorist organization or network. This may be
signaling a more proactive and global counter-terrorism policy, less
constrained in targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure.191

In a warning to terrorist groups who may seek weapons of mass destruction, President Clinton cited past efforts by the Al Qaeda terrorist
network to acquire chemical and other dangerous weapons as one of the
reasons for the U.S. attack. The Clinton administration had not only declared war on terror, but had also laid down the framework which the
George W. Bush administration would take to the next level in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.
A. September 11, 2001: Crossing the Rubicon?
In a coordinated operation, whose breadth and audacity stunned the
world, terrorists believed to be part of the Al Qaeda network carried out
the worst terrorist attack in modern times, targeting various symbols of

186. See Brennan, supra note 178, at 1197.
187. Id. at 1210.
188. Id. at 1209–10.
189. See Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the
Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1095 (2000).
190. Id. at 1096 (“If the purpose of the strikes was retaliatory, it contravened conventional international law. If the strikes were motivated by self-defence, it appears that the
necessary elements [an armed attack, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality] were not
present.”).
191. Perl, supra note 175.
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U.S. supremacy and leaving over three thousand people dead.192 The day
after the attacks, the UN Security Council tersely stated that “[t]he magnitude of [the] acts goes beyond terrorism as we have known it so far . . .
. We therefore think that new definitions, terms and strategies have to be
developed for the new realities.”193 On the same day, the UN General
Assembly, at its first plenary meeting of the year, adopted Resolution
56/1 without a vote, urgently calling for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism and stressing that those responsible
for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers, and
sponsors of such acts would be held accountable.194
Nine days later, on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush
pledged: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped, and defeated.”195 The UN Security Council agreed with
President Bush on the urgent need to fight terrorism.196 In addition, every
major regional organization, including the Arab League, agreed that the
September 11th hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon were acts of terrorism in violation of international law.197

192. Four commercial aircraft were hijacked, two of them were flown into the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, causing both buildings to collapse.
A third aircraft crashed into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia, which houses
the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. armed forces. The
fourth aircraft crashed near Somerset, Pennsylvania. See RAPHAEL PERL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 1, 3 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports (order code IB95112).
193. Valeriy Kuchinsky, Ukrainian Representative to the United Nations Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 3–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (2001).
194. G.A. Res. 56/1, ¶ 4, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/49
(Sept. 12, 2001).
195. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20,
2001), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/ [hereinafter Response].
196. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
197. The UN General Assembly condemned the attacks as illegal and criminal acts of
terrorism. G.A. Res. 56/160, ¶ 3, U.N. GOAR, 56th Sess., 88th plen. mtg., Agenda Item
119b, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (Dec. 19, 2001). The Security Council condemned the
attacks “as a threat to international peace and security.” S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196.
The Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization of American
States, Association of South East Asian Nations, Organization of African Unity, and
Arab League also agreed that the hijacking of American passenger airliners by al Qaeda
terrorists was criminal. See, e.g., Colin Powell, A Long, Hard Campaign, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 15, 2001, at 53.
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UN Security Resolution 1368, passed a day after the September 11th
attacks, unequivocally condemned the attacks, calling on all states to
“work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers
and sponsors”198 of the attacks, and thus reaffirmed the inherent right of
self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.199 The
U.S. right of self-defence was often mentioned in the same breath as the
terrorist attacks. “Given the circumstances, this affirmation was significant: it implied that the attacks triggered the right even if, at the time of
adoption, the UN Security Council knew almost nothing about who or
what had launched them.”200
The shift in the law of pre-emption was evident. The international response to retaliatory military strikes made by Israel against Tunisia in
1985 had been strongly condemnatory, despite Israel’s argument that
Tunisia’s acts of harboring, supplying, and assisting non-state actors who
they claimed committed terrorist acts in Israel should be sufficient to attribute the acts to the state.201 Notwithstanding Israel’s claims of selfdefence, in Resolution 573 the Security Council condemned the 1985 air
attack on PLO headquarters as an “act of armed aggression . . . in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law
and norms of conduct.”202 The fact that Resolution 573 condemned Israel’s attack as contrary to the UN Charter implied that no justification
based on self-defence was recognized. Subsequently, the claim of selfdefence was also rejected by states as justification for the U.S. bombing
of Tripoli and the 1993 bombing of the Iraqi Secret Service.203 The international response to the September 11th attack was an important departure from the reasoning in Resolution 573.
Amidst a swell of international support, the United States quickly identified the Al Qaeda terrorist network, with the support of the Taliban
198. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196, ¶ 3.
199. Id. pmbl.
200. Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism
since September 11th, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 475, 481 (2001).
201. Admittedly, the situation differs in exact factual circumstances from the September 11th attacks, but does reflect the general stance of the international community prior
to that event. The Security Council was obviously faced with a situation that profoundly
differs from the previous incidents where there were limited casualties.
202. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985). See generally Marian Nash
Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM.
J. INT’L L. 151, 165–67 (1986) (discussing the UN Security Council’s condemnation of
Israel’s air attack).
203. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 407 (2002).
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government, as the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks.204 This
was coupled with the recognition that the modern threat to U.S. power
and security rises not from one particular organization, but from the
growing threat of international terrorism, particularly terrorism that enjoys active or tacit state support.205 The Security Council’s resolutions
following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan explicitly mention the right of
individual and collective self-defence and do not contain any condemnation of the military strikes.206
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan signaled a renewed determination on the part of the United States to combat international terrorism and states that sponsor it; the operation laid fertile ground for debate on the strategic or legal approach that states should adopt in responding to such threats. Strategically, the U.S. military action was based
on the “Reagan Doctrine” of swift and effective retribution against terrorist organizations that strike U.S. interests,207 as well as the “Shultz
Doctrine” of active military engagement of terrorists and states that
sponsor or support them. Though legally the U.S. justified “Operation
Enduring Freedom” under the established doctrine of self-defence,208 talk
from Washington suggested pre-emptive self-defence.
Essentially, the United States did not consider military action against
Afghanistan as a formal war against the state but pre-emption of further
attacks by terrorists based in that state. As the United States moved
against Afghanistan, the highest levels of military, legal, and diplomatic
policymakers in Washington began debating how the country should
confront states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of mass
destruction. The immediate focus of the debate was U.S. policy towards
204. See Response, supra note 195, at 1140 (“The evidence we have gathered all
points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaeda.”).
205. The war on terror “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped, and defeated . . . . From this day forward, any nation that continues
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”
Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42.
206. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452nd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1390 (2002); S.C. Res. 1401, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4501st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1401 (2002).
207. See Crelinsten & Schmid, supra note 15, at 307, 316. The policy described by
Crelinsten and Schmid has clearly been continued by Reagan’s successors. This is evident in Clinton’s air strikes against Iraq for the attempted assassination of George H.W.
Bush and his strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan following the embassy bombings in
Tanzania and Kenya.
208. For a discussion of the international legal validity of U.S. military action “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan, see Beard, supra note 173, at 559.
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Iraq. Soon after the military action in Afghanistan, President Bush provoked heated reaction with his “Axis of Evil” speech209 and its strong
overtones of the use of unilateral military action by the United States
against countries that support terror, and an intimation of expanding the
theatre of operations beyond Afghanistan without Security Council approval. 210
B. The “Bush Doctrine”
Though the genesis of the “Bush Doctrine” can be traced to the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks,211 it was five months after
the “Axis of Evil” speech, on June 1, 2001, that President Bush delivered
the fullest exposition of the doctrine in a speech at West Point.212 Warning that the United States faced “a threat with no precedent” through the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of global
terrorism, President Bush stated that the traditional strategies of deterrence and containment were no longer sufficient.213 Because of the new
threats that the United States faced, he claimed that a proper understanding of the right of self-defence would now extend to authorizing preemptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting them off before they
are able to launch devastating strikes.214 Under these circumstances, he
concluded that “[i]f we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have
waited too long.”215 Expounding on the strategic aspect of the doctrine,
President Bush stated that there was a need to “take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they
emerge.”216 In the same address, he went on to tell future U.S. military
officers at West Point that “[t]he military must be ready to strike at a
moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. All nations that decide
for aggression and terror will pay a price.”217 That doctrine carried an
explicit warning for Iraq and other states that pursue weapons of mass
destruction: if a hostile regime pursues the acquisition or development of
209. George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
210. See id.
211. Nine days after the attacks, U.S. President George Bush announced the new aggressive national policy towards terrorism. See Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42.
212. See West Point Commencement Address, supra note 16.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, the decisive use of pre-emptive
military force is a legitimate response.
President Bush spent months building the case for war against Iraq,
however his justifications were often confusing and long on rhetoric but
short on substance. His primary argument, however, invoked a sweeping
new foreign policy based on the right of the United States to pre-emptive
self-defence, the need to punish Iraq for not complying with the Security
Council resolutions to which it had agreed in exchange for an end to the
Gulf War, and the need for massive retaliation.218 President Bush seemed
unsure of the exact contours of his doctrine, tying up pre-emptive strikes
with retaliation (which the author avers falls under the rubric of peace
time reprisal).
The National Security Strategy document, issued by President Bush in
September 2002, asserted:
Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or
citizen to defend . . . . Containment is not possible when unbalanced
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons
or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies . . . . If we wait for
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited for too long . . . . In the
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.
And this nation will act.219

Though the more modest argument of retaliation may have been the
strongest, the U.S. response was increasingly articulated more firmly in
favor of anticipatory self-defence:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack . . . .
The U.S. has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To fore218. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations
General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002); George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President
(Apr. 13, 2004).
219. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16, at 15 (emphasis added).
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stall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if
necessary, act pre-emptively.220

The National Security Strategy document referred to the longstanding
policy as an option, not a principle.221 Interestingly though, the UN Charter, the centre point of the legal framework on the international use of
force, was not mentioned, and no attempt was made to anchor the formal
articulation of the option within the umbrella of the Charter.
Despite the United States’ maneuverings while formulating a postSeptember 11th security strategy, it had Iraq firmly in its sights. The
United States and its allies continued to put forward what even then was
regarded by many as faulty intelligence,222 in an attempt to link Iraq to
the September 11th attacks.223 Before the war, despite international and
domestic skepticism, the hawkish Bush administration had already decided that the tragic events of September 11th had altered the context of

220. See id.
221. Id. at 15.
222. Dana Priest, U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link to Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002,
at A1 (reporting that CIA analysts are unable to validate allegations that the Iraqi government has ties to Al Qaeda); Walter Pincus, No Link Between Hijacker, Iraq Found,
U.S. Says, WASH. POST, May 1, 2002, at A9; KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING
STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ xxi–xxiii (2002); see also JOHN KAMPFNER,
BLAIR’S WARS (2003); No 10 Denies Straw Had War Doubts, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept.
15, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1042511,00.
html; Matthew Tempest, Hoon Regrets “Misunderstanding,” GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 11,
2003, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1039958,00.html (alleging that documents used to bolster the United States’ claims that Iraq presented a nuclear threat were crudely-forged documents relating to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium
from Niger).
223. Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted that he was unaware of any “smoking
gun” linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks. Notwithstanding Powell’s admission,
President Bush and other senior U.S. government officials continued to rally around
questionable intelligence. They sheepishly admitted months later, after the war in Iraq
was officially over, what most states suspected all along—there was no link between Iraq
and the September 11th attacks. Bill Keller, The World According to Colin Powell, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Nov. 25, 2001, at 61. On September 17, 2003, President Bush stated that
there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, disputing an idea held by many Americans. This came a day after his
hawkish Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said he had not seen any evidence that
Saddam was involved in the attacks. The National Security Adviser came out in support
of the Bush and Rumsfeld sentiments, saying “[w]e have never claimed that Saddam
Hussein had either direction or control of 9/11.” Greg Miller, No Proof Connects Iraq to
911, Bush Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
security/issues/iraq/justify/2003/0918proof.htm.

446

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

the United States-Iraq confrontation.224 The resulting U.S. shift to an aggressive Iraq policy forced it to advance rather dubious legal justifications for a full-scale invasion. Relying on the multifaceted “Bush Doctrine,” the policy advocates pre-emptive or preventive strikes against terrorists, states that support terrorists, and hostile states possessing weapons of mass destruction.
The United States’ new aggressive anti-terror campaign began with
multilateral condemnation of terrorism. The United States and the United
Kingdom successfully encouraged the UN Security Council to pass
Resolution 1441,225 which gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with
its disarmament obligations through weapons inspections. Impatient with
the slow pace of the UN weapons inspection process, the United States
soon assumed that Iraqi was involved in terrorist activity and that Iraqi
capacity for weapons of mass destruction persisted.226
The U.S. national security officials were adamant in their commitment
to act fast and to act alone and increasingly balked at UN control over the
use of force against rogue states that present perceived security threats.227
The end-game of this debate was cemented by President Bush when he
announced that “the policy of [the U.S.] government is the removal of
Saddam [Hussein].”228 This announcement effectively cut off all future
multilateral activities with the UN.
Possibly, in light of the dubious intelligence linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks, the United States cited Iraq’s capacity to use weapons of mass destruction as an additional justification for self-defensive
anticipatory intervention against Iraq.229 Self-defence, it was suggested,
224. POLLACK, supra note 222, at xxi–xxiii.
225. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶¶ 1, 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). The UN Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441. The resolution declares Iraq to be in material breach of its obligations under past UN mandates. It also informs Iraq it will face
“serious consequences” if it fails to cooperate. It is questionable whether it authorises a
member-state to unilaterally take action in the event of further non-compliance.
226. Much debate abounds about the credibility of the U.S. evidence regarding Iraq’s
links to Al Qaeda. The issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction, the quantity and nature is yet another controversy. Admittedly, it is difficult to conclude one way
or the other but what stands out is the fact that the international community remained
divided over the matter right up to the day of military action.
227. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16.
228. Allies Discuss Terrorism and the Middle East: Bush and Blair on Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at A14.
229. Traditionally, anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence has not been favoured
under international law. See Byers, supra note 203, at 410. However, the notion of preemptive “counter-proliferation” forms an important part of the new U.S. national security
strategy. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16.
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also fueled the need for internal “regime change” in Iraq and U.S. support of such change.230 In March 2003, without waiting for the UN Security Council to declare Iraq in breach of Resolution 1441 and, thus, a
threat to international peace and security for which the Council could
explicitly authorize military intervention,231 the United States and its allies proceeded with military action against Iraq premised on pre-emptive
or anticipatory self-defence. The technologically superior U.S. army
waged a highly-organized, technical “shock and awe” campaign that impressed an otherwise angry international community, and drove Saddam
Hussein out of power.232 The war against Iraq was to be the defining
moment in the evolution of the “Bush Doctrine,” marking a growing coherence and confidence in the strategy of “offensive defense.”
Despite the United States’ focus on pre-emptive intervention, the action against Iraq and the United States’ subsequent occupation was undertaken against a background of vehement opposition from a large section of the international community, including some major powers.233 If
Afghanistan had set the stage for the evolution of anticipatory selfdefence, the overbreadth of the U.S. action in Iraq action dismantled it.
The regime on force does not support the operationalisation of preemptive self-defence against Iraq as it did in Afghanistan, and the circumstances surrounding U.S. intervention in Iraq differ fundamentally
from those in Afghanistan. The United States did not conclusively prove
that Al Qaeda maintained Iraqi training bases or that it received financial,
logistic, or military support from the Iraqi government.234 The strategic
and legal calculus for action in Iraq did not compare favorably to that
which motivated U.S. action in Afghanistan in late 2001. Unlike the
230. The United States affirmed it would provide “‘lethal assistance’ in the form of
military training and arms to Iraqi opposition volunteers and Kurdish fighters in Iraq.”
Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Drafting Resolution to Impose Deadline on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A14; Julia Preston & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: The
UN Diplomacy; U.S.-French Split on Iraq Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A1
(reporting that the CIA had begun covert operations in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq
with a view to fomenting an uprising in Iraq).
231. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. A plain reading of Resolution 1441 suggests that
there would be another UN Security Council meeting in the event of an Iraqi breach, at
least to discuss the inspectors’ report, at which point the use of force could be authorised.
On the other hand, the use of fuzzy and ambiguous language could be read as supporting
the notion that the Security Council is allowing individual states greater interpretive latitude in deciding when force can be used.
232. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 17.
233. Id. at 11.
234. Id. at 9.
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questionable connection between Iraq and the September 11th attacks,
there were clear ties between the terrorists involved in the U.S. attacks
and the government of Afghanistan.235
Not surprisingly, military action against Iraq has split the international
community and inflamed the world’s major powers, as it raises both policy and legal matters. Considering that the use of armed force can only
be justified under the international law regime when used in self-defence,
can the United States go beyond the rhetoric and actually carry the war
on terror to those rogue nations who are identified as supporters and
sponsors of terrorist activities, but have not physically engaged in an act
of aggression against the United States?236 The convergence of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction presents a grave threat
to international peace, security, and prosperity by threatening the survival of entire nations. This threat multiplies exponentially when governments foster and encourage these dual scourges. However, the aggressive “Bush Doctrine” is disturbing because an old problem in contemporary international law (anticipatory self-defence) is being touted as a
newly appropriate vehicle in the war against international terrorism, despite the prevailing view in the international community that the “armed
attack” requirement in Article 51 of the UN Charter superseded any preexisting right of anticipatory action.
The old truism that “international law is not a suicide pact,” may be
forceful in “an age of uniquely destructive weaponry,”237 however, “strategically, there is little precedent for a major U.S. military offensive
against a state that has not proximately used force against [the United
States].”238 While a number of legitimate justifications might permit the
use of force, the international legal system does not currently provide a
legal outlet for such force.239 “An international law doctrine, under which
the [United States] could execute the military campaign it successfully
launched against Iraq, does not currently exist. That lacuna was seemingly plugged with the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ that advocates pre-emptive
strikes against rogue states and/or entities involved in terrorism.”240 The
235. Id. at 11.
236. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era:
The “War on Terror,” 4 SCHOLAR 209 (2002).
237. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 231, 239 (1992).
238. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at
14.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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Doctrine’s reliance on the premise of pre-emptive self-defence resurrects
the idea of a “right of self-preservation” that fell into disuse in the early
part of the twentieth century with the prohibition of war and the legal
demarcation of the limits of the right to self-defence outlined in the UN
Charter.241
C. Reflections on the Use of Force as a Counter-Terrorism Measure in
Light of the UN Charter
1. Armed Attack and Self-Defence
Contrary to the intentions of the authors of the UN Charter, the system
of collective security has been of little practical significance, and state
aggression continues to be determined by the unilateral use of force by
states.242 Commentators argue that, because the customary right of selfdefence includes action beyond armed attack, military force may be legally available as an option against terrorists, even if an armed attack has
not occurred.243
This view holds that the presence of an armed attack is one of the bases
for the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51, but not the
exclusive basis.244 The sentiments of these commentators are also reflected by some major states.245 In support of such an expansive interpretation of “armed attack,” certain international legal scholars “believe that
state sponsorship and support of international terrorists constitutes a use
of force contemplated by Article 2(4).”246 This is not an entirely idle argument considering that the scope and content of the prohibition of the
use of force in contemporary international law cannot be determined by
241. See id.
242. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 27, at 1620.
243. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of
Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 12 (2003) (“Although
Article 51 refers to the right of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs,” the

United Kingdom and the United States have consistently maintained that the
right of self-defense also applies when an armed attack has not yet taken place
but is imminent. This view of self-defense can be traced back to the famous
Caroline incident of 1837.”).

244. See James P. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 159, 170–71 (1986); Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633–34.
245. See Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11,
at 30–32 (“. . . Israel and the U.S. have been particularly notorious in seeking to rely upon
the concept of anticipatory self-defence on numerous occasions . . .”).
246. See RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATESPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 113 (1989).
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an interpretation of Article 2(4) alone. Rather, the provision must be read
in context with Articles 39, 51, and 53. These articles contain a number
of terms that, though related to one another, differ considerably in their
meaning. Thus notions such as “use or threat of force,” “threat to the
peace,” “breach of the peace,” “act of aggression,” “armed attack” and
“aggressive policy” are used but do not receive any further explanation
in the Charter.247 Neither legal writing nor state practice has clarified
these terms beyond doubt. Nor have attempts within the framework of
the United Nations led to a satisfactory interpretation. Therefore, there is
still no sound basis for redefining the Charter’s prohibition of the use of
force.
State practice (albeit restricted to only a few states, notably the United
States and Israel) seems to support the view that terrorist bombings may
constitute an armed attack justifying self-defence under Article 51. For
example, the United States justified its cruise missile attack against Sudan and Afghanistan following the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as an exercise of self-defence.248 The
United States has considered terrorist bombings to be armed attacks for
some time and has accordingly justified several U.S. military actions
against states that have supported terrorists.249
It is significant that the Security Council characterized the terrorist acts
as “armed attacks.”
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, it is also necessary to ask whether the concept of “armed attack” in Article 51 of the
Charter is capable of including a terrorist attack . . . . There is, however,
no a priori reason why the term should be so confined. There is no
doubt that terrorist acts by a state can constitute an armed attack and
thereby justify a military response. The UN General Assembly included
certain types of terrorist activity committed by states in its definition of
aggression in 1974. Similarly, the International Court of Justice, in its
judgment in the Nicaragua case in 1986, considered that covert military
action by a state could be classified as an armed attack if it was of suf-

247. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, arts. 39, 51, 53.
248. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51
of the UN Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 49–50 (2002).
249. Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 46 (1989); see also Letter Dated April 14,
1986 From Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/17990
(1986).
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ficient gravity. The level of violence employed on September 11, 2001
undoubtedly reached that level of gravity.250

This view was expressly affirmed by other international bodies including NATO and the OAS.251 This characterization may lead one to conclude that:
The international reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 confirms
the commonsense view that the concept of armed attack is not limited
to state acts. The UN Security Council, in its resolutions 1368 and 1373
(2001), adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, expressly
recognized the right of self-defense in terms that could only mean it
considered that terrorist attacks constituted armed attacks for the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, since it was already likely, when
these resolutions were adopted, that the attacks were the work of a terrorist organization rather than a state.252

By recognizing the “inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence” in the preambles of Resolution 1368 and Resolution 1373, the
Security Council acknowledged that self-defence motivated the military
strikes against the Taliban in 2001. 253
Nothing in the language of Article 39 or the rest of the Charter suggests
that only threats emanating from states can fall within its scope. In recent years, the Security Council has had no hesitation in treating acts of
international terrorism, whether or not “state-sponsored,” as threats to
the peace for the purposes of Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, even before September 11, 2001, the Council had characterized as a threat to
international peace and security Libyan support for terrorism . . . .254

250. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 16–17.
251. North Atlantic Council, Statement on Collective Self Defense (Sept. 12, 2001),
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/sept_11/sept_11_
archive/statement_by_north_atlantic_council_on_collective_self-defense.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, meeting in consultation, likewise invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in declaring that “these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are
attacks against all American States.” Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OAS
RC.24/Res.1/01 ¶ 1, OEA/Ser.F/II.24 (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.oas.org/
OASpage/crisis/rc.24e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
252. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 17.
253. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 196; G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(Sept. 28, 2001) (“. . . reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution
1368 . . . ”).
254. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 19.
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The main question is how the events of September 11th affect the interpretation of the “armed attack” requirement under the UN Charter.
Despite the assertion above, in the author’s view, the Security Council’s
statement implies that the difficult question of whether the terrorist attacks constituted “armed attacks” depends on interpretation. As this author has noted:
Resolution 1368 is ambiguous on the issue. In its preamble, Resolution
1368 “recogni[ses] the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense in accordance with the Charter,” but in the operative part of the
resolution describes the attacks as “terrorist attacks” (not armed attacks) that “represent a threat to international peace and security.” In
summary, Resolution 1368 . . . does not explicitly recognise that the
right of self-defense applies in relation to any parties as a consequence
of the September 11 attacks.255

Even if the right of self-defence extends beyond the “armed attack” of
Article 51, serious hurdles must be overcome before a traditional theory
of self-defence can be used to justify attacks against terrorists or terrorist
facilities located in another state. If the anticipated action by terrorists is
not sufficiently imminent, the right to use force is not available for purposes of deterrence.256 Some argue that even if the right of self-defence
extends beyond the “armed attack” requirement of Article 51, the UN
Charter would not permit the use of force to punish an aggressor after a
threat had passed, nor permit the use of force to deter a less than imminent threat.257 In any case,
if past terrorist actions by a group are too remote in time, the response
by force is likely to be characterized as an illegal reprisal. It appears
that if a right to use force in self-defense exists apart from an armed at255. Jackson Maogoto, War on the Enemy: Self-Defense and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 406, 434 (2003). By “recognizing the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter,” the preambular paragraph of
Resolution 1368 appeared to imply that the terrorist acts in New York, Washington, and
Pennsylvania represented an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN
Charter. A similar preambular paragraph was also included in Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373, supra note 253.
256. Terry, supra note 244, at 171. In his article, Terry makes the point that, given the
rapid delivery capabilities of terrorist organisations, it is unrealistic to require that a state
wait until an attack is imminent before responding. The Israelis used similar arguments to
justify their attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak and these arguments were rejected by the United Nations and the world community. See O’Brien, supra note 76, at
450–51.
257. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military
Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 145, 162 (2000).
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tack, it is a right that presents a very narrow window of opportunity. In
fact, this window of opportunity, under the traditional criteria for selfdefense, will almost never exist in the context of terrorist attacks. The
traditional requirements for self-defense are simply too restrictive to
reasonably respond to the threat posed by international terrorism.258

2. Pre-emptive Self-Defence
Under customary international law, the right of self-defence was
judged by the standard first set out in the 1837 case of the Caroline,
which established the right of a state to take necessary and proportional
actions in anticipation of a hostile threat.259 Based on the Caroline incident, anticipatory self-defence must be “necessary,” “proportional,” and
take place “immediately.”260 As noted elsewhere in this Article, Article
51 of the UN Charter is generally taken as an authoritative definition of
the right of self-defence. However, scholars and states alike have continued to debate whether the enactment of Article 51 subsumed customary
international law and extinguished the concept of anticipatory selfdefence, or whether it simply codified a right that continues to exist with
all its attendant doctrines under customary international law. The answer
is in the interpretation.
Proponents of the continuing customary right to pre-emptive selfdefence have cited the impracticability of applying a literal interpretation
of Article 51 in an age of advanced weapons, delivery systems, and
heightened worldwide terrorist activity.261 Adherents argue the absurdity
258. Id. at 165–66.
259. 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409–14 (1906). The
“affair of the Caroline” involves a U.S. ship, the Caroline, being used by U.S. citizens to
transport reinforcements to Canadian territory in support of insurgents battling Great
Britain’s rule. Id. at 409. A small British force crossed into U.S. territory and destroyed
the Caroline. Id. at 409–10. Great Britain defended its action on the grounds that it was a
necessary act of self-defence. Id. at 410. The case is illustrative of a state’s right to undertake necessary actions in “anticipatory” self-defence of an impending, though not necessarily imminent, hostile attack. Another case on point is the Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9), which has been cited for the proposition that the International Court of Justice recognised a residual right to reprisal remaining in the international legal order, the Charter of the United Nations notwithstanding. Roda Mushkat, Is
War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Survey, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227,
252 (1987).
260. See Roberto Ago, Addendum to the 8th Report on State Responsibility (pt.1 concluded), [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, 68–69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5–7
(describing requirements frequently viewed as essential conditions for admissibility of
self-defence pleas).
261. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 30–31.
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of requiring a state to refrain from taking action on its own behalf when
an opposing state is preparing to launch an attack.262 Given the devastating potential of modern weapons and the swiftness of delivery to their
intended targets, denying a state the right to act in advance of a pending
attack effectively denies any defence at all. The same rationale applies to
states threatened with impending terrorist attacks on their citizenry or
property.
Some scholars have noted that it cannot be supposed that the inviolability of territory is so sacrosanct as to mean that a state may harbor
within its territory the most blatant preparation for an assault upon another state’s independence with impunity; the inviolability of territory is
subject to the use of that territory in a manner which does not involve a
threat to the rights of other states.263 Further supporting this position is
that there is no literal requirement under Article 51 that a foreign government itself directly undertake the attack to which a state responds.
Thus, the harboring of terrorists may give rise to legitimate, legal justification for anticipatory military intervention. Any such claim, however, is
still fundamentally one of self-defence, and still restricted by threshold
requirements, including imminence, necessity, and proportionality.264
Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that a right of truly anticipatory self-defence has emerged outside of Article 51, based not on preexisting customary law, but on the availability of weapons capable of
mass destruction.265 Thomas Franck accounts for the emergence of a viable doctrine of anticipatory self-defence through
the transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant destruction. These [weapons] brought into question the conditionality of Article 51, which limits states’ exercise of the right of self-

262. See generally Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defence
(A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25
(1987).
263. BOWETT, supra note 64, at 191–92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 245, at 109.
264. See Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi
Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 147 (1999).
Some scholars would further limit the right of anticipatory self-defence, adding, inter
alia, last resort, reasonableness, and a requirement of reporting to the UN Security Council. See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 245, at 145–50.
265. BOWETT, supra note 64, at 191–92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 246, at 142–
43.
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defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first strike capabilities begat a doctrine of “anticipatory self-defense” . . . . 266

Other scholars opine that in a nuclear age, there are potentially devastating consequences for prohibiting self-defence unless an armed attack
has already occurred, leading states to prefer the interpretation permitting
anticipatory self-defence.267 Christopher Greenwood argues further that
this view accords better with state practice and with the realities of
modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation
of Article 51, which would confine the right of self-defense to cases in
which an armed attack had already occurred . . . 268

Greenwood goes on to undertake a critical analysis of “Operation Enduring Freedom” against the benchmarks of “necessity,” “proportionality” and “imminence.” He notes:
The pre-emptive action that the United States and its allies took against
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was . . . a lawful exercise of the right of selfdefense. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that self-defense
would cover every military action that the United States or an ally
might want to take against Al-Qaeda (or other terrorist groups) in other
countries. The use of force in Afghanistan fell within the concept of
self-defense because the threat from Al-Qaeda was imminent and because Afghanistan was quite openly affording sanctuary to large numbers of Al-Qaeda personnel. These considerations will not necessarily
be present in every case.269

There are, of course, debates as to whether “Operation Enduring Freedom” met the benchmark of proportionality. The U.S. case is not helped
by calls for “regime change” in relation to rogue states which the United
States is keen to put out of business, especially when they seek to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction. Assuming for the moment
that the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan simply altered the balance of
power in the civil war, when we juxtapose “Operation Enduring Freedom” against “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” significant legal questions are
left open. As Michael J. Kelly notes:
Unilaterally, the United States articulated its right to act preemptively
to eliminate the threat posed by a potentially nuclear-armed Iraq. How-

266. Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without
Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 51, 57–58 (2001).
267. Greenwood, supra note 243, at 15.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 25.

456

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

ever, because the existence of an imminent threat could not be established, when the president brought the old anticipatory self-defense
doctrine back to life, he eliminated that threshold and replaced it with
the showing of only an “emerging” threat.270

Kelly further avers that, in the absence of a link between Iraq and Al
Qaeda, the United States sought a doctrine that would legitimize an attack on Baghdad.271 Considering that
a plain reading of Article 51 disallows striking Iraq absent an armed attack, the Bush Administration is required to return to the legal history
books and pull out another disused doctrine to justify any unilateral
military action it may take. The one that seems to fit best, albeit imperfectly, is the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.272

Notwithstanding the allure of a policy of anticipatory self-defence,
there is little basis for such an extension of the UN Charter’s right to selfdefence. In justifying its attacks on Iraq, the United States relied on the
concept of anticipatory self-defence, while seeking to dilute the Charter’s
prohibition with customary international law. UN Charter aside, there is
no basis in international law to support the doctrine of “pre-emption”
encompassing a right to respond to threats that might materialize at some
time in the future. The test is clear—imminence, which connotes immediacy, is required to trigger self-defensive actions. A broad right of anticipatory self-defence premised on a new standard of “emerging threat”
would introduce dangerous uncertainties relating to the determination of
potential threats justifying pre-emptive action. With this determination
being state-based, the probability of opportunistic interventions justified
as anticipatory self-defence will rise. After all, the reality is that only
states with the military muscle will be able to make use of this avenue,
and unilateral action will inevitably be colored by national interest considerations. The development of such a right will likely prompt potential
targets into striking first—to use rather than lose their biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
3. Reprisals
With regard to reprisals, the text of the UN Charter represents a conventional rejection of the just-war theories of retribution abandoned in

270. Kelly, supra note 87, at 2.
271. Id. at 22.
272. Id.
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the seventeenth century. 273 The purpose of the United Nations is to limit
the use of force in international matters and to provide a forum for the
resolution of conflict so as to prevent the need for war. In the history of
the United Nations, there have been authoritative condemnations of both
pre-emptive and retaliatory reprisal actions.274 It seems safe to conclude
that both are widely expected to be inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations and are, therefore, proscribed under Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter.
Previous military actions by the United States against terroristsupporting states elicited varying responses from the international community and the United Nations. In the case of the 1986 raid on Libya, the
United States was largely condemned.275 The UN General Assembly
adopted a resolution condemning the United States for the attack by a
vote of 79-28, with 33 abstentions.276 The UN Secretary General, Javier
Perez de Cuellar, stated that the U.S. action violated international law.277
Though a UN Security Council resolution echoing the General Assembly’s sentiment was vetoed by the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France, France did call the air strikes “reprisals that itself revives the
chain of violence.”278 In contrast, the United States’ 1993 cruise missile
attack on Baghdad in response to the foiled Iraqi assassination attempt on
former President Bush was met with support or tacit acquiescence.279 In
273. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 (“All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”); U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” ).
274. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 188, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964); S.C. Res. 316,
¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/316 (June 26, 1972). See also Richard Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 263, 266–67 (1985). See
generally Geoffrey M. Levitt, International Law and the U.S. Government’s Response to
Terrorism, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 755 (1986).
275. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at
34.
276. G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986).
277. Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Bombing Baghdad, Revisited: Lawful Self-Defense
or Unlawful Reprisal?, CONN. L. TRIB., July 19, 1993, at 24.
278. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 182, 187 (1987).
279. See Stephen Robinson, UN Support for Raid on Baghdad, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), June 28, 1993, at 1; Craig R. Whitney, European Allies Are Giving Strong Backing to U.S. Raid: Arab Governments Critical, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A7.
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response to the U.S. presentation before the UN Security Council, the
representatives of other member states either expressed support for the
U.S. action or refrained from criticizing it; only China questioned the
attack.280 The General Assembly took no action.
Five years after the cruise missile attacks on Baghdad, world reaction
to the 1998 U.S. strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
was mixed. Western European nations supported the U.S. actions to
varying degrees, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared he was
“outraged” by the “indecent” behavior of the United States.281 China issued an ambiguous statement condemning terrorism, and Japan said it
“understood [the United States’] resolute attitude towards terrorism.”282
The aforementioned incidents were wrapped up in the rhetoric of selfdefence and retaliation, leading to the observation that, although the prevailing view is that reprisals are illegal, states may still engage in them.
For example, the 1986 bombing of Libya is cited as a peacetime reprisal and not an act of self-defense. Therefore, while writers state emphatically that reprisals are illegal, state practice continues to resort to
them on occasion, cloaking them in terms of self-defense while remaining careful to comply with Naulilaa criteria.283

V. CONCLUSION
The international community has long been uneasy with the use of
military action as a counter-measure against terrorism. In 1986, when the
United States bombed Libya in response to a terrorist act, President
Reagan called the action “pre-emptive” on the ground that there was already a pattern of Libyan terrorist actions.284 The justification did not go
over well with the international community. Roughly a decade later, in
1998, after terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
the United States fired cruise missiles on Sudan and Afghanistan.285
President Clinton argued that there was compelling evidence that the Al
Qaeda terrorist network was planning to mount further attacks against

280. Stanley Meisler, UN Reaction Mild as U.S. Explains Raid, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
1993, at A1.
281. Phil Reeves, Outraged Yeltsin Denounces “Indecent” U.S. Behavior,
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Aug. 22, 1998, at 2.
282. See id.
283. Kelly, supra note 87, at 13.
284. Reagan: We Have Done What We Had to Do, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at
A23.
285. Beard, supra note 173, at 562.

2006]

WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE

459

Americans, and he was thereafter entitled to act.286 Apart from a few
western governments, which approved or kept quiet, most states condemned the Clinton air strikes.287 Conversely, the 2001 U.S. bombing of
Afghanistan was widely supported by the international community. But
in 2003, when the United States launched military action against Iraq, it
did so against a background of protests from a large section of the international community, “squandering away the legal and moral capital it
had gained in the action against Afghanistan.”288
The attacks of September 11th, the response by the United States, and
the international community’s approval of the military action in Afghanistan represent a new paradigm in international law relating to the use of
force. Previously, acts of terrorism were seen as criminal acts, carried out
by private, non-governmental entities.289 In contrast, the September 11th
attacks were regarded as an act of war.290 This effectively marked a turning point in the long-standing premise in international law that force,
aggression, and armed attacks are instruments of relations between
states.291 Terrorism was no longer merely a serious threat to peace and
stability to be combated through domestic and international penal mechanisms; use of force is now seen as an attractive and satisfying countermeasure in managing terrorism. However, subsequent U.S. military action in Iraq was shrouded in confusing legal justifications and questionable, even faulty evidence. This has raised skepticism among scholars
and the international community that self-defence was used and misused,
thus preventing the evolution of any meaningful state practice.
As a result of the United States’ aggressive policy, certain discarded
pre-UN Charter doctrines are being revived in one form or the other, notably the concept of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence. Some critics have warned against the inherent dangers of resurrecting such preCharter doctrines, noting that:

286. See Arthur Brice, Terror Suspect Says Now It’s War, U.S. Ready, Says Official:
“We’re Going to be on the Offence as Well as Defence,” ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 22,
1998, at A1.
287. Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror, supra note 11, at 32.
288. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 14.
289. Maogoto, War on the Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra
note 255, at 431.
290. Id. at 431, 433.
291. Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2
(2003).
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One of the very reasons the world community decided to do away with
them was to reduce legal justifications for, and thus the possibility of,
unilateral military action. The pre-Charter doctrines were used erratically and unreliably prior to 1945. Now, if these doctrines are returned
to service by the world’s superpower and are allowed to pass into customary practice once again, we will find ourselves in a time warp back
to 1945—a period of fear, uncertainty and suspicion; a period of global
dominance by a handful of nations; a period defined by the geopolitics
of raw power and militaristic influence; a period of instability devoid of
collective security. Even more disturbingly, some of the re-articulated
rules have been watered down to allow more latitude in unilateral action.292

However in a spirited defence of pre-emptive action, other scholars assert: “Waiting for an aggressor to fire the first shot may be a fitting code
for television westerns, but it is unrealistic for policy-makers entrusted
with the solemn responsibility of safe-guarding the well-being of their
citizenry.”293 However, these critics are missing the central point—when
military action is undertaken, things get real—real bombs, real missiles,
real deaths. Unilateral state sponsored military action must not be based
on mere apprehension backed by dubious or unclear intelligence. Once
the military action is over it cannot be unmade by commissions of inquiries or concessions that perhaps a few facts were overstated. UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, in remarks regarding anticipatory self-defence during the opening of the 58th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2003, summed up the dilemma thus:
Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the
inherent right of self-defense. But until now it has been understood that
when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with
broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique
legitimacy provided by the United Nations. 294

Annan concluded that in light of the reality of weapons of mass destruction, “We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment

292. Kelly, supra note 87, at 3.
293. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 552 (2002).
294. Press Release, General Assembly, Adoption of Policy of Pre-Emption Could Result in Proliferation of Unilateral, Lawless Use of Force, Secretary-General Tells General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8891/GA/10157 (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.
un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8891.doc.htm.
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no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was
founded.”295
The UN Charter seems to present a neat and tidy regime on the use of
force. Nonetheless it reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a
political system to govern conflicts between states and does not directly
address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in the postWorld War II period.296 The drafters did not contemplate the existence of
international terrorists nor “fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and
technology of modern day terrorism.”297 In view of the fact that terrorist
groups appear to have reached a global sophistication, there is little doubt
that international terrorism presents a threat with which traditional theories for the use of military force are inadequate to deal, and were unanticipated when the UN Charter was drafted.298 The international community has no option but to develop new strategies within the rubric of international law to deal with terrorism and the reality that international
law seems to restrict the use of military force to actions in self-defence.

295. Id.
296. See Albert R. Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 307 (1987) (“The self-defense provisions of
the UN Charter, crafted in 1945 with a view to the kinds of open, conventional aggression that triggered World War II, does not address directly the subtler modes of international violence characteristic of the 1980s.”).
297. Baker, supra note 262, at 25.
298. Id.; see also Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37
NAVAL L. REV. 49, 64–70 (1988).

